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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
The current sugar policy of the United states, which is 
designed primarily to protect the domestic sugar industry 
through the use of quotas on imports, has long been 
criticized by economists as being unfair and inefficient 
(Johnson; Leu, Schmitz and Knutson; Ives and Hurley). Yet it 
has been basically unchanged through administrations of both 
parties since the 1930s. Sugar policy may not be achieving 
the goals for which it was designed. The supply and demand 
for sugar are undergoing dynamic changes which may force the 
u.s. to make very difficult policy choices in the near 
future. 
Over the last two decades u.s. per capita total 
sweetener consumption has increa~ yet per capita sugar 
consumption has declined dramatically as high fructose corn\ 
(---·· ---------- ----··· - - --- - - -~----
---- ---- ------
syrup (HFCS) has replaced sugar as an ingredient in many 
foods and beverages. The linkage between policy and these 
trends in sugar demand needs to be carefully examined. 
u.s. sugar production has risen to record levels in 
recent years, during which time the price support level has 
1 
2 
been constant in nominal terms, and declining in real terms. 
To support the u.s. sugar price above the world price, the 
.- ---~---------~-~~-. 
U.S. has had to reduce sugar import quotas each year since 
they were instituted in 1982. The countries which have 
traditionally exported sugar to the u.s. include many 
developing countries which suffer export revenue losses when 
u.s. sugar imports decline. 
Objectives 
The effects of u.s. sugar policy are felt by all sectors 
of the industry, domestic and foreign. The overall objective 
of this study ls to analyze the effects of this policy. 
Specific objectives are to: 
1) measure the effects of u.s. sugar quotas on 
p~-~~~~ers, con~~IIl~rs, taxJ?_~¥e:_!_, and f-~~«:lgE-_ s~ppl i ers 
2) measure the welfare effects of the recent trend 
of substitution of High Fructose Corn Syrup for sugar 
3) evaluate the welfare effects of the alternative 
policies of an equivalent tariff and a deficiency payment 
program 
4) forecast the welfare effects of continuation of 
the current quota policy for the next two years. 
Organization of the Study 
In Chapter II, a survey of U.S. sugar policy and recent 
supply and demand trends will be presented. other studies of 
sugar policy and the sugar industry are evaluated. 
3 
The conceptual framework of the analysis is presented in 
Chapter III, which consists of three sections. The first 
section includes a discussion of the derivation and use of 
equilibrium demand and supply curves, which allow measurement 
~------
within a single market of the_welfa~~~s of policy upon 
--------~--
a group of related markets, such as the corn .sweetener and 
sugar markets. In the second section the analytical 
techniques used to measure producer and consumer surplus are 
presented, where use is made of the equilibrium demand and 
supply curves explained in the first section. In the final 
section justifications for the use of a random coefficients 
model are presented. 
In Chapter IV empirical estimates of u.s. sugar supply 
and demand equations are presented. 
The impacts of the u.s. quota policy on sugar users, 
producers, taxpayers and foreign suppliers are presented in 
Chapter V, based upon the empirical supply and demand 
equations of Chapter IV. A forecast of the welfare 
implications of continuing the current quota policy is made, 
based upon a forecast of supply, demand and imports, with 
special reference to trade implications. Conclusions are 
presented in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
SUMMARY OF U.S. SUGAR POLICY AND RECENT 
TRENDS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
In order to develop an econometric model of sugar supply 
and demand it is important to understand the industry and 
trends occurring in recent years. The recent history of u.s. 
sugar policy, the U.S. sugar and sweetener industry, and 
recent trends in the supply and demand for u.s. sugar are 
described in the Chapter. The degree to which published 
econometric models have been able to capture these trends is 
also evaluated. 
History of U.S. Sugar Policy 
The United States first instituted a tariff on sugar on 
July 4, 1789, not long after a revolutionary war fought in 
part over tariffs on sugar. The justification then was 
revenue for the young country. Revenue has long since ceased 
as an objective of sugar policy, but government intervention 
continues. 
Current legislation has its origins in the Sugar Act of 
1934, also known as the Jones-Costigan Act. The Jones-
Costigan Act was designed to assist sugar growers who faced 
lower priced sugar from abroad, and all subsequent sugar 
4 
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legislation has had the same basic purpose. Most sugar 
legislation since the 1930s has included the following 
provisions: (i) a duty on imported sugar, which is 
periodically adjustable (ii) strict import quotas allocated 
among exporting countries on political considerations (iii) 
allotments of domestic production among the various beet and 
cane growing areas (iv) mechanisms to guarantee to producers 
a minimum price, including a nonrecourse loan program (v) 
provision for equity of program impacts between cane and beet 
growers. Minimum wage rates for field workers and child 
labor provisions have been included in some of the acts. 
Since the U.S. has always imported sugar, u.s. sugar 
policy is strongly affected by events in the world markets. 
The world sugar price from 1960-87 is shown in Table 1, and 
it is seen to fluctuate widely and rapidly, even on an annual 
average basis. In Figure 1 the world sugar price peaks of 
1963, 1974 and 1980 are clearly seen. This sugar price cycle 
has been described by many experts in the following way. 
Each cyclical price peak in the world price has resulted in 
an expansion of production, which soon brings price lower. 
Due to protection and government subsidies, however, the 
higher supply capacity is maintained during periods of low 
prices. Eventually, consumption increases to the point where 
another price jump is triggered. U.S. prices follow world 
prices upward, but not downward. 
The following is a brief description of u.s. sugar 
legislation since the early 1970s. More details can be found 
Yea:r 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
TABLE 1 
SUGAR PRICES, 1960-87 
Wo:rld 
Raw 
(1) 
New Chicago u.s. 
Yo:rk Refined Retail 
Raw Refined 
(2) (3) (4) 
-----cents pe:r pound----------
3.1 
2.9 
3.0 
8.5 
5.9 
2.1 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
3.4 
3.8 
4.5 
7.4 
9.6 
30.0 
20.5 
12.0 
8.1 
7.8 
9.7 
29.0 
16.9 
8.4 
8.5 
5.2 
4.0 
6.1 
6.7 
6.3 
6.3 
6.5 
8.2 
6.9 
6.8 
7.0 
7.3 
7.5 
7.8 
8.1 
8.5 
9.1 
10.3 
29.5 
22.5 
13.3 
11.0 
13.9 
15.6 
30.1 
19.7 
19.9 
22.0 
21.7 
20.3 
21.0 
21.8 
8.77 
8.59 
8.95 
10.34 
9.38 
9.15 
9.44 
9.70 
9.94 
10.23 
11.08 
11.59 
11.82 
12.38 
32.07 
27.87 
16.93 
15.08 
18.93 
19.68 
38.29 
28.26 
27.62 
26.10 
25.66 
23.18 
23.42 
23.60 
11.6 
11.8 
11.7 
13.6 
12.8 
11.8 
12.0 
12.1 
12.2 
12.4 
13.0 
13.6 
13.9 
15.1 
32.3 
37.2 
24.0 
21.6 
23.7 
24.9 
42.7 
40.0 
34.5 
36.2 
36.3 
35.3 
35.1 
35.3 
Source: USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports 
(1) F.o.b. Ca:r1bbean, cont:ract No. 11 
(2) C.i.f., duty/fee paid, Contract No. 12 
(3) Wholesale refined beet sugar list price, 
Chicago-West market 
(4) Refined sugar retail price, average 
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Figure 1. Sugar Prices, 1961-87 
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8 
in the USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports. In 1974, high world 
prices contributed to the fact that the existing sugar 
legislation, which expired on December 31, 1974 was not 
replaced. Consumers and producers had faced high sugar 
prices in 1974 and there was little political pressure for 
continuance of support for an industry which was apparently 
healthy. 
However, by 1977 low world prices stimulated new 
legislation. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 provided 
support to the domestic industry in the form of non-recourse 
loans and import fees and duties to try to prevent 
forfeitures of sugar to the Commodity Credit Corporation. In 
1979, sugar policy reverted to authority based on the 
Agriculture Act of 1949, and supported raw sugar prices in. 
the range of 14-16 cents per pound, the same of the 1977 
legislation. High world prices occurred again in 1980 and 
1981, so that no government support was deemed necessary. 
7 
.J,..:-.J' c.-/ , 
Following the 1981 price peak new legislation was 
enacted with a nonrecourse loan rate of 17 cents, which was 
1....-
l .... }~r \ :hi" 
to rise in several steps to 18 cents by 1985. It became an 
important goal of policy to avoid overt government 
expenditures on sugar. Strict quotas, at the time thought to 
be temporary, were instituted by the President in May~~~ 
and have continued to the present. A Market Stabilization 
Price (MSP) was established, which was designed to prevent 
the posslbili ty of any ex~e.!l~.!~ures on sugar by the federal 
government. The USDA is charged with periodically 
9 
calculating the MSP, and ensuring that is it high enough to 
loan. Import quotas 
The 1985 Food Security Act provided for continuance of 
sugar policy more or less as it had been under the 1981 
legislation, and continued the loan rate at 18 cents a pound 
for raw sugar. A significant change in the 1985 legislation 
was that the recommendation that sugar policy be conducted at 
no monetary cost to the federal government was made 
mandatory. Thus the MSP became an even more certain floor 
price for producers than it had been before, and the 
---·---··-··----------------··-------~---...._ _______ ·---·~·-··~-----~-----~ 
possibility of loan forfeitures was almost eliminated. 
In 1987, the U.S. raw sugar price was about 21¢ per 
pound, while the world "free" market raw sugar price was 
about 6¢ per pound. Since the U.S. enacted the latest round 
of import quotas in 1982, the differential between the u.s. 
and world raw sugar price has averaged 14.6¢ per pound (USDA, 
1987a). 
Trends in u.s. Sugar Supply 
Table 2 shows annual u.s. beet, cane and total sugar 
production from 1960 to 1987. Production has exhibited a 
rising trend from about 3.5 million metric tons refined value 
in 1960 to over 6 million metric tons in 1987, as is clearly 
seen in Figure 2. 
Beet production has exceeded cane production in all 
years except from 1982-84. Figure 3 gives acreage harvested 
10 
TABLE 2 
U.S. SUGAR PRODUCTION, 1960-87 
Year cane Beet Total 
--------------------------------------------(thousand metric tons, refined value) 
1960 1327.7 2077.2 3404.9 
1961 1653.3 2038.2 3691.5 
1962 1672.0 2192.5 3864.5 
1963 1936.5 2624.9 4561.4 
1964 1972.1 2787.7 4759.8 
1965 1968.7 2453.7 4422.4 
1966 2075.5 2397.7 4473.2 
1967 2245.1 2234.9 4480.0 
1968 2074.7 2953.0 5027.7 
1969 1911.0 2823.3 4734.4 
1970 2048.4 2883.5 4931.9 
1971 2065.4 3011.5 5076.9 
1972 2323.1 3072.6 5395.7 
1973 2161.2 2713.1 4874.3 
1974 2129.8 2472.3 4602.1 
1975 2487.6 3407.5 5895.1 
1976 2309.5 3302.4 5611.9 
1977 2275.6 2635.1 4910.7 
1978 2214.6 2788.6 5003.1 
1979 2289.2 2440.9 4730.1 
1980 2312.9 2669.9 4982.8 
1981 2401.9 2872.5 5274.4 
1982 2596.9 2320.6 4917.5 
1983 2484.2 2288.3 4772.5 
1984 2549.5 2463.0 5012.5 
1985 2571.5 2543.5 5115.0 
1986 2781.8 2896.2 5678.0 
1987 2855.5 3354.9 6210.5 
-----------------------------------------------------Source: USDA, Sugar and Sweetener Reports 
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13 
of beet and cane, and shows a large drop in sugarbeet acreage 
starting in 1975, before the increasing trend which started 
in 1982. These declines in sugarbeet acreage were due 
primarily to the closing of sugarbeet refineries; in just one 
year, 1981-82, five factories closed. In 1970 there were 58 
factories, with a total capacity of slicing 193,000 tons of 
beets per day, and in 1987 there were 36 factories, with a 
total slicing capacity of 168,000 tons of beets per day 
(USDA, Sugar and sweetener Report). Thus, production has 
increased in recent years even as the number of factories has 
declined. Slicing capacity per factory has risen, however, 
as has the utilization of capacity, which can be extended not 
only by increasing the amount of beets sliced per day, but 
also by extending the length of the slicing season. 
Yields are shown in Figure 4. Both cane and beet yields 
show considerable variation, which is due primarily to 
weather and disease. Since 1983 both acreage harvested and 
yield have increased for both beet and cane, except for a 
small decline in beet yield in 1985. The yield of cane sugar 
increased about 7.5 percent between 1975-80 and 1981-85, 
compared to a yield increase for beet sugar of about 2.3 
percent over the same period. 
Figure 5 shows real sugar price and u.s. production of 
sugar on a normalized scale from 1970-87. The real price has 
~ -------·----------.·-"' 
declined since 1981, and yet since 1983, production has been 
increasing. This phenomenon will be important to capture in 
the specification of the supply equation. For the moment it 
·-·-------
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16 
will merely be noted that when producers know that price can 
not fall below a certain level, one important source of risk 
is removed. This reduction of future price risk, which lasts 
for the duration of the legislation, provides an increase in 
the expectation of profitability to sugar p.rQ(i_!lcers. It is 
- --· ----...__ 
also possible for current production to be influenced by 
expected future legislation. 
Trends in u.s. Sugar Demand 
Table 3 shows U.S. per capita consumption of various 
sweeteners from 1960 to 1987. Per capita sugar consumption 
was fairly steady at almost one hundred pounds per person per 
year during the 1960s and early 1970s, though trending slowly 
upwards. From 1960 to 1971, per capita sugar consumption 
rose by about 5 pounds per year. But after 1971, per capita 
consumption fell almost continuously until 1987, when it rose 
slightly from 1986 levels. The decline from 1971 to 1986, 
from about 100 to about 60 pounds, is about forty percent. 
This decline is strongly associated with sugar policy and the 
rising consumption of corn sweeteners and low calorie 
-~-----...... ____ ...,__ ____ ,._,._~_,..,., __ ,__. ·····---·~·"'"-··~·-~ . -~---~-·- .......... ~........,,_. _ __,-'<• • ·' ......... -·~-----·""""" ........ "'-·--'~ 
sweeteners. 
In contrast to declining sugar consumption, per capita 
consumption of all sweeteners has risen steadily during the 
last three decades. Total caloric sweetener consumption rose 
from 111.2 pounds per person in 1960 to 132.4 pound per 
,~,~--"~·-~-- ... -,, ·-· ·"··-·-~..,.-----•-.•"""'"'~~-· ___ ,.. .. ~-- --~"-' 
person in 1987, an increase of 21 pounds or about 20 percent. 
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TABLE 3 
u.s. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF VARIOUS 
SWEETENERS, 1960-1987 
---------------------------------------------------------
Year Refined Corn Total Total Total 
Sugar Sweeteners Low Caloric All 
Calorie Sweeteners 
---------------------------------------------------------
------ pounds per capita 
------------------
1960 97.6 11.6 2.2 111.2 113.4 
1961 97.8 12.0 2.5 111.7 114.2 
1962 97.9 12.9 2.9 112.8 115.7 
1963 97.3 14.2 3.7 113.3 117.0 
1964 96.8 15.0 4.8 113.5 118.3 
1965 97.0 15.1 5.7 113.9 119.6 
1966 97.3 15.4 6.4 114.4 120.8 
1967 98.5 16.1 6.9 116.1 123.0 
1968 99.2 16.9 7.2 118.0 125.2 
1969 101.0 18.2 6.9 120.8 127.7 
1970 101.8 19.3 5.8 122.6 128.4 
1971 102.1 20.8 5.1 124.3 129.4 
1972 102.3 21.1 5.1 124.9 130.7 
1973 100.8 23.4 5.1 125.6 130.7 
1974 95.7 25.1 5.9 121.9 127.8 
1975 89.2 27.5 6.1 118.1 124.2 
1976 93.4 29.7 6.1 124.4 130.5 
1977 94.2 31.2 6.6 126.8 133.4 
1978 91.4 33.7 6.9 126.6 133.5 
1979 89.3 36.3 7.3 127.1 134.4 
1980 83.6 40.2 7.7 125.1 132.8 
1981 7·9. 4 44.5 8.2 125.1 133.3 
1982 73.7 48.2 9.4 123.2 132.6 
1983 ·71.1 52.2 13.0 124.6 137.6 
1984 67.4 57.8 15.8 126.6 142.5 
1985 63.0 66.5 18.0 130.9 142.4 
1986 60.2 67.1 18.5 128.7 148.9 
1987 62.2 68.8 19.0 132.4 147.2 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Source: USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports 
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Low Calorie Sweeteners 
Low calorie sweetener use has been trending upwards in 
the u.s. since the early 1960s. From 1960 to 1971, 
consumption of all low calorie sweeteners rose from 2.2 to 
5.1 pounds per person per year (sugar-weight equivalent 
basis), rising in most years, but slackening off somewhat 
during a period of "cancer scare" when sweeteners containing 
cyclamates were banned in 1970. From 1970 to 1982, the 
dominant artificial sweetener was saccharin. Table 4 shows 
consumption of saccharin, aspartame and total low calorie 
sweeteners from 1960 to 1987. The introduction of aspartame 
in 1982 shows dramatically in Table 4, as consumer acceptance 
of aspartame has been good. Figure 7 shows the dramatic 
decline in per capita sugar consumption at the same time that 
per capita low calorie sweetener consumption is rising. 
The Food and Drug Administration has recently approved a 
new artificial sweetener, acesulfame K, for certain uses; it 
has about the same sweetening power as aspartame (200 times 
that of sugar) but is more stable and possibly cheaper. The 
Center for Science in the Public Interest says the sweetener, 
to be marketed under the brand name Sunette, caused tumors in 
laboratory animals (New York Times, 7/27/88). Similar 
concerns have been raised about aspartame, but these concerns 
have not reduced consumption significantly. It is likely 
that new products will continue to be developed, and in time 
low calorie sweeteners could cut further into the market 
share of the caloric sweeteners. 
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TABLE 4 
u.s. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF LOW 
CALORIE SWEETENERS 1960-1987 
-------------------------------------------
Calendar Sacc- As par- Total 
Year harin tame Low calorie 
and Sweeteners 
Other 
-------------------------------------------
pounds per capita 
1960 2.2 0.0 2.2 
1961 2.5 0.0 2.5 
1962 2.9 0.0 2.9 
1963 3.7 0.0 3.7 
1964 4.8 0.0 4.8 
1965 5.7 0.0 5.7 
1966 6.4 0.0 6.4 
1967 6.9 0.0 6.9 
1968 7.2 0.0 7.2 
1969 6.9 0.0 6.9 
1970 5.8 o.o 5.8 
1971 5.1 0.0 5.1 
1972 5.1 0.0 5.1 
1973 5.1 0.0 5.1 
1974 5.9 0.0 5.9 
1975 6.1 0.0 6.1 
1976 6.1 o.o 6.1 
1977 6.6 0.0 6.6 
1978 6.9 o.o 6.9 
1979 7.3 0.0 7.3 
1980 7.7 0.0 7.7 
1981 8.0 0.2 8.2 
1982 8.4 1.0 9.4 
1983 9.5 3.5 13.0 
1984 10.0 5.8 15.8 
1985 6.0 12.0 18.0 
1986 5.5 13.0 18.5 
1987 5.5 13.5 19.0 
Source: USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports 
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Corn Sweeteners 
u.s. annual per capita consumption of corn sweeteners 
rose from 11.6 pounds in 1960 to 67.9 pounds in 1987, as 
Table 3 shows. This is an increase of about 600 percent in 
just twenty-seven years. Figure 7 clearly shows the rising 
per capita corn sweetener consumption trend since about 1970, 
along with the declining sugar consumption trend. As is also 
seen in Figure 7, per capita consumption of corn sweeteners 
exceeded per capita consumption of sugar for the first time 
in 1985. 
Table 5 shows the per capita consumption of the corn 
sweeteners. Glucose and dextrose are used primarily in 
baking and confectionery products, and their market share has 
remained relatively constant, although per capita dextrose 
consumption doubled from 1960 to 1987. The most dramatic 
increases are seen with the High Fructose Corn Syrups, HFCS-
42 and HFCS-55. HFCS-42, which was introduced in 1969, has 
been substituted for sugar in many commercial products, and 
has risen to a per capita consumption level of 18.9 pounds in 
1987. HFCS-55, which was not introduced until 1981, has 
achieved a per capita consumption level of 28.4 pounds in 
1987. 
HFCS-42 derives its name from the fact that it contains 
42 percent fructose, the remainder being dextrose and other 
polysaccharides. HFCS-55 contains 55 percent fructose, 42 
percent dextrose, and 3 percent other polysaccharides. The 
HFCS products have a low potential for crystallization which 
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TABLE 5 
U.S. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF CORN SWEETENERS, 1960-87 
HFCS-42 HFCS-55 Total Glucose De~trose All 
HFCS Corn Corn 
Year Syrup sweeteners 
------- pounds per capita per year 
---------
1960 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 3.6 11.6 
1961 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 3.4 12.0 
1962 0.0 0.0 o.o 9.3 3.6 12.9 
1963 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.9 4.3 14.2 
1964 o.o o.o 0.0 10.9 4.1 15.0 
1965 0.0 o.o 0.0 11.0 4.1 15.1 
1966 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 4.2 15.4 
1967 0.0 0.0 o.o 11.9 4.2 16.1 
1968 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.6 4.3 16.9 
1969 o.o 0.5 0.5 13.2 4.5 18.2 
1970 0.0 0.7 0.7 14.0 4.6 19.3 
1971 0.0 0.9 0.9 14.9 5.0 20.8 
1972 o.o 1.3 1.3 15.4 4.4 21.1 
1973 0.0 2.1 2.1 16.5 4.8 23.4 
1974 0.0 3.0 3.0 17.2 4.9 25.1 
1975 o.o 5.0 5.0 17.5 5.0 27.5 
1976 o.o 7.2 1.2 17.5 5.0 29.7 
1977 0.0 9.5 9.5 17.6 4.1 31.2 
1978 0.0 12.1 12.1 17.8 3.8 33.7 
1979 0.0 14.9 14.9 17.9 3.6 36.4 
1980 0.0 19.1 19.1 17.6 3.5 40.2 
1981 4.2 16.8 21.0 17.8 3.5 42.3 
1982 6.6 19.7 26.3 18.0 3.5 47.8 
1983 9.0 21.0 30.0 18.0 3.5 51.5 
1984 14.3 21.5 35.8 18.0 3.5 57.3 
1985 22.5 22.5 45.0 18.1 3.5 66.6 
1986 27.4 18.2 45.6 18.0 3.6 67.2 
1987 28.4 18.9 47.3 18.0 3.5 68.8 
Source: USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports 
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is often a problem in products with high solids and high 
sucrose content (Carmen and Thor). Each different sweetener 
has characteristics which make it more desirable for certain 
uses, even at a higher price. At the same time, there is a 
wide range for varying the percent of any one sweetener in 
most commercial applications; and many products contain three 
or four sweeteners, the precise mix being determined by 
technological and market conditions at any one time. The 
same trend of increasingly easy substitutability is seen is 
other markets such as the oilseeds. 
Until it was rescinded on October 29, 1974, the Food and 
Drug Administration had a regulation which placed a ceiling 
of 25 percent of total sweetener content in jams, jellies, 
and preserved which could be obtained from corn sweeteners 
(carmen and Thor). While the u.s. has eliminated regulatory 
restraint of corn sweetener use, Japan, the European 
Community and several other countries continue to restrict 
the use of corn sweetener in order to protect sugar 
interests. 
The soft drink market plays a particularly important 
role as a consumer of HFCS. The major soft drink companies 
were hesitant to risk changing their formulas in the early 
--·-------------
1980s, when HFCS-55 came onto the market. But in December 
1984, the soft drink industry decided to allow HFCS 
substitution of up to 100 percent for sucrose in its syrups 
(Lin and Novick). Soft drink consumers have not generally 
objected to the substitution. 
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At the same time that HFCS-55 was being developed and 
allowed to penetrate new markets such as soft drinks, the 
soft drink market was growing rapidly. In 1986, for the 
first time Americans drank more soft drinks than any other 
liquid, including water. Table 6 shows the market 
penetration of HFCS in 1987 by sector. HFCS has achieved the 
most dominance in the beverage market, where it had achieve9 
a 96 percent market share of sweeteners used in the industry 
in 1987. The right column of the table provides an estimate 
of the long-run maximum penetration of HFCS in each market. 
For beverages, baking, canning, processed foods, and dairy 
products, it appears that HFCS has achieved its limit of 
market penetration; and in confections its potential limit of 
5 percent leaves little room for growth. 
Econometric Studies of the Sweetener Industry 
A study of HFCS substitution for sugar was done by 
Carman and Thor in 1979, who used a logistic growth curve 
model to project HFCS market penetration. Their projections 
to 1985 are shown in Table 7, along with actual 1985 data. 
The projections for glucose and dextrose and the minor 
sweeteners (honey and maple syrup) were quite accurate, and 
exactly correct on a per capita basis. But their projection 
for per capita consumption of HFCS was too low by almost 100 
percent, a forecast of 24.7 pounds compared with an actual 
consumption rate of 45 pounds. Similarly, their forecast of 
1985 per capita sugar consumption, 82.6 pounds, was almost 20 
TABLE 6 
HFCS PENETRATION BY MARKET CATEGORY 
Sector 
Beverages 
Baking 
1987 
Canning 
Processed Foods 
Dairy Products 
Confections 
HFCS Share of 
caloric 
Sweeteners 
Long-term 
Theoretical 
Penetration 
----- percent -----
96 
25 
66 
66 
35 
3 
90-100 
25 
60-70 
60-70 
35 
5 
source: Lin and Novick 
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TABLE 7 
u.s. CONSUMPTION OF SWEETENERS, PROJECTED 
AND 
Glucose 
Minor Sweeteners 
HFCS 
Sugar 
Total 
Source: Projected 
Actual 
ACTUAL, 1985 
Per capita Total 
Projected Actual Projected Actual 
22.8 22.8 2630 2776 
1.4 1.4 161 170 
24.7 45 2848 5390 
82.6 63.3 9527 7579 
131.5 131.4 15166 15716 
-Carmen and Thor (1979) 
-USDA, Sugar and Sweetener Report 
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pounds higher than the actual consumption rate was 63.3 
pounds. Events such as the major soft drink bottlers 
switching to 100 percent usage of HFCS in their products, and 
the extent of the increase in the popularity of soft drinks, 
were apparently not anticipated in 1979. 
In a study for the World Bank, de Vries (1980) made 
projections for U.S. sugar consumption, production and 
imports, as shown in Table 9. The table gives data in total 
metric tons. de Vries' projection for total U.S. sugar 
consumption was 10,181 tons, compared to the actual 1985 
value of 7540 tons. That level of actual total consumption 
was below any year since the 1940s. 
de Vries also made projections for world sugar price, 
shown in Table 8. The ranges shown for the projected prices 
were calculated by making 500 runs of the model using 
stochastic changes in the explanatory variable "stock 
changes", and setting the range such that 2.5 percent of all 
projections fell above and below it. The quoted price range 
was presented by de Vries as a 95 percent confidence interval 
on expected prices. But the actual price was outside the 95 
percent confidence interval in the first projected year, and 
in fact in only one year of six (1981) did actual price fall 
with the 95 percent confidence interval.· 
These forecasting errors could be due to numerous 
causes. The studies quoted above relied on traditional, 
fixed coefficient eco~ometric techniques, and did not include 
a variables for "policy". It is difficult, if not 
---"'---··------~---·-····-~·-·- _____ __..-.... ~-~-------
TABLE 8 
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL SUGAR PRICES 
Year Projected Actual 
--cents per pound--
1980 13-26 29.0 
1981 15-38 16.9 
1982 17-46 8.4 
1983 14-38 8.5 
1984 11-30 5.2 
1985 7-24 4.0 
Sources: Projected price- de Vries 
Actual Price - USDA Su9ar 
and Sweetener Report 
TABLE 9 
U.S. ACTUAL AND PROJECTED SUGAR PRODUCTION, 
CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS 
Actual 
1974-76 
Average Projected 
1985 
Actual 
-------Thousand metric tons----
Production 
Consumption 
Imports 
5930 
9822 
4331 
5787 
10181 
4768 
Source: Projected -de,Vries, p. 59 
7278 
7540 
2113 
Actual -USDA Suqar and Sweetener Reports 
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impossible, to endogenize policy variables in models, but 
without a specification which can include policy impacts, 
results are likely to be disappointing. Random coefficients 
models provide a technique to capture policy impacts which 
·could not be explicitly specified in a conventional model, 
and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides a conceptual framework for the 
welfare measures which are derived in Chapter v, and for the 
supply and demand equation estimations of Chapter IV. The 
first section describes the theory underlying the equilibrium 
demand curves used for welfare analysis. The next section 
·-·--.. -- ....... __ ~ 
outlines the analytical techniques to be used in evaluating 
-·--,----------~· ·-··---·-·--·-·----
alternative U.S. sugar policy options. The last section 
describes the Cooley-Prescott random coefficient model used 
in the empirical estimation of the supply and demand curves. 
Derivation of Equilibrium Demand Curves 
Given appropriate supply and demand curves, economic 
theory can· be used to derive measures of the welfare effects 
. -~ .~~-'·' ..•. -~- - . 
·-------.......... •.. ---~-· '"?0 .. 
of various policies on different economic groups. The 
following analysis, based on the work of Just, Hueth and 
Schmitz (1982, Chapter 9), provides a technique to capture 
welfare impacts in several related markets. 
Let there be two horizontally related industries, A and 
B, producing goods A and B which are substitutes in 
consumption. Figure 8 shows the industries in initial 
equilibrium at prices P~ and Pi. Since the goods are 
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substitutes in consumption, the demands for each good are a 
function of the price of the other good, and initial 
equilibrium demands are DA(Pi) and Da(P~). Supply of good B 
is Si(P~), while the supply curve for good A is horizontal at 
the (controlled) price line,P~, assuming marginal cost is 
less than the price. 
Initially the price of good A is fixed at PX. Now 
suppose that authorities raise the price of good A to Pk. In 
a partial equilibrium framework, ceteris paribus, consumers 
would reduce purchases, cutting consumption from Qo to 01. 
But the price increase for good A has effects in the 
market for good B. Given the higher price Px, the demand fo~ 
good B shifts to D.(PkJ, and the supply of good B shifts 
outward from Sa(Pi) to Sa(P~), perhaps as a result of 
economies of scale. Th~ net result is a drop in the price or 
good B from Pi to Pi. 
This change of price for good B will cause the demand 
curve for good A to shift from DA(Pi) to DA(Pa), so that 
...... ···h·~-"""--'"'"'~----·"··<-~·-·~-- -'" "-"'~-. ._,,_.,., .... 
instead of producing at 01, industry A will end up producing 
The actual demand curve facing industry A, then, is D •, 
which is the "equilibrium" demand curve associated with the 
price change from Pi to Px after taking into account 
equilibrium adjustments in the related market. By 
assumption, good B is the only significant substitute good in 
this example. 
An important property of a curve such as D • is that the 
change in consumer surplus defined with respect to an 
equilibrium demand curve meas~~eE_the net change. in 
producer/consumer surplus for all affected industries for 
which adjustments are considered in the equilibrium demand 
curve. If D • was an equilibrium demand curve in the sugar 
~arke~ for example 1 and corn sw::_!:E.=-~a~_.!._he .. on_!y_~-~r 
industry in the sector, then welfare measures based on D • 
----
would capture the surplus measures for sweetener users, 
sweetener-containing product users, and corn sweetener 
manufacturers. 
----·---
Partial equilibrium surplus measures, traditionally 
34 
associated with partial equilibrium supply and demand curves, 
measure returns to fixed factors in those markets only. For 
.. ,....... ____ ..... ~c-...-'~.,..~·>""'"--'~,._,,,....,..,,_......,.,,.,."'-<><••'-'<••L-•""""""'"'1.;''>.-... •..,..,_...,,.,,...,,,,~_,~ ... ,,.,.,, ~·,·~.---.-,,,..,,,,.'<0_,.,~, 
example, the producer surplus associated with a competitive 
supply curve condi tio_ned .9n fixed inp~t prices measures 
returns or quasi-rent to the associated fixed production 
factors. All other prices are uninfluenced by the behaviour 
of such a firm; and the producer surplus does not capture 
effects in any other markets. A fully general equilibrium 
. ..._~- .,...........-.----
model would capture producer and consumer impacts of a 
p~~-:~~~-~-E;ig.e ___ s!l..~~9~-?.!_~~~~=·-·,:·~,~~~!.!7_~:_:_~~~ · Such a 
fully general equilibrium model is, however, not possible to 
construct. This analysis uses assumptions which effectively 
that equilibrium statements about the sec.~~r _ c~!l:. be made. 
--~-----·-··"""·'~. --------.... --~ 
To see this more clearly, imagine a hypothetical merger 
of the above two industries, A and B, into a single 
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competitive industry. Given that they were competitive, this 
would imply identical behaviour under profit maximization as 
if they were separate industries, with identical quasi-rents 
and consumer surplus areas. In Figure 8, after the price 
increase of good A from Pi to Px, consumer surplus in the 
hypothetical merged industry falls by area c + d. Thus, the 
net social welfare loss over the affected industries is area 
c + d, measured in the diagram for the first industry. 
Since the discussion of curves such as o• in Figure 8 
involves dynamic responses, it is necessary to clarify why o• 
is in fact a single-period equilibrium demand curve. In 
Figure 9, suppose demand is initially 0+ and equilibrium 
price and quantity are Po and Oo, respectively. Consider a 
two-period analysis, where in the first period (short run) 
consumers respond along 01 since other prices are held fixed. 
In the second period, other prices are assumed to have 
adjusted, so that the demand curve shifts, for example to 
01'. 
Suppose that policy-determined price is increased from 
Po to P1. In the first period, consumers would reduce 
consumption from Oo to 01. In the second period, prices of 
substitute goods would have adjusted, causing the demand 
curve to shift to D1', and so consumers would further reduce 
consumption to Oz. 
If price Po had continued, inducing no change in the 
demand curve, consumer surplus would be measured by 
a+b+c+d+e+f+g. With the higher price P1 and demand curve 02, 
Price I 02 
p1 .\ 
Po ,... r----1.. 
0 ~ 01 00 Quantity 
Figure 9. Demand in Two Separate Time Periods 
Source: Just, Hueth & Schmitz w 
en 
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consumer surplus is area e+f. The change in short-run 
consumer surplus resulting from the price increase would 
appear to be the difference, a+b+c+d+g. 
But the movement between equilibria, from (Qo, Po) to 
(Qa, P1) traces out an intermediate run demand curve, Da, 
which is the relevant marginal valuation curve of consumers, 
allowing for two-period demand adjustments. Total surplus 
changes are found by summing or integrating over the relevant 
... ~-~~-----~---- ...._..--' 
marginal curves between the prices. Thus the correct measure 
~--"«··-·---------------· 
of the change in consumer surplus in the second time period, 
as viewed from the beginning of the first time period, is the 
intermediate run consumer surplus area, a+b+c. 
The change in consumer surplus over the two periods is 
not the sum of all the short-run consumer surpluses for each 
·------·-~--·- .. -.-----·-·-· -··-·· -·-------------
period, but the sum of the consumer surpluses of variable 
-·-~~· .. ~·-"-·-····---~"--_,-,~ ·~· r ,._ ... ~.-~~"'"
 _., ... , ···- ... 
lengths of run, as viewed from the initial point of time. 
In Figure 9, adding up the change in consumer surplus in 
the first time period, a+b+c+d, to the change in short run 
consumer surplus for the second time period, a+b+c+d+g, does 
not yield a correct measure of the change in consumer surplus 
resulting from the price increase over the two periods from 
Po to P1. The total change for the two periods would be the 
. _________ ,..,_...---·---~ 
change in. ~.\U'P l u§ cor.r ~~ IU>..!1.5!Ll'l9-:l= cLE.=.. .. _ f o.=__.~~_! i ?:-~~ .. ~= :z: i. od, 
a+b+c+d, plus the change in surplus corresponding to Da in 
the second period, a+b+c. 
Generalizing, the change in consumer surplus for any 
particular period is determined by calculating the change in 
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consumer surplus corresponding to the one-period demand curve 
for the first period, the two-period demand curve for the 
second period, the three-period demand curve for the third 
period, and so on. 
To see why the area a+b+c is not a measure of two-period 
surplus, instead of a measure of the second-period surplus, 
note that the horizontal axis in Figure 8 measures quantities 
for a single time period, regardless of the demand curve 
beingidrawn. Consider a diagram which measures the 
aggregated two-period demand curve, such as Figure 10. D1 
and Dz are duplicated from Figure 9, and are horizontally 
summed to yield D1+2, the appropriate demand curve for the 
two periods taken together. Note that the horizontal axis 
measures quantity over two periods of time. In the first 
period, responses will be along 01. The correct "marginal_ 
valuation" curve for the aggregate two-period diagram, 
however, is O:a.+z· Mathematically, area a'+b'+c' equals area 
a+b+c; thus, the aggregate two-period surplus change 
associated with the price increase from Po to P:a. is 
a+b+c+d+a'+b'+c'. An equivalent result extends to any number 
of time periods. Thus, the change in consumer surplus in the 
second period is measured by the area a+b+c, confirming the 
results from Figure 9. 
Welfare Analytics·of Alternative Sugar Policies 
This section graphically depicts the u.s. and world 
sugar markets and describes the techniques used to compare 
Price 
01 
p1 
Pol a I~\ .~ ( K ~ 
..... 
0 
01 + 2 
~ 01 00 Quantity in two time periods 
Figure 1 0. Demand Added Over Two Time Periods 
Source: Just, Hueth and Schmitz 
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the welfare results of alternative u.s. sugar policies. The 
analysis follows that of Leu et. al. (1987). 
The definition of producer surplus used in this study is 
the area below the price line and the marginal cost curve of 
the producer. This area equals total revenue minus total 
variable costs; it also equals profit plus total fixed 
·-·------costs. For an individual consumer, consumer surplus equals 
the area above the price line and below the demand curve. It 
is not a measure of utility; it is a money measure which can 
be taken to represent a change in utility. If the demand 
curve represents the derived demand curve of a profit-
maximizing firm, then the consumer surplus measure (of the 
demanding firm) is exactly analogous to the producer surplus 
measure. 
Existing Program; Quotas 
Figure 11 shows the U.S. and world sugar markets, under 
the assumption that the U.S. is a large enough participant in 
'""'"''"''--"" .. ~-.... ..c~--.., .. ,_-· _ _.._,_ .. __ _ 
world sugar markets to influence the world price. The 
initial supply and demand curves are So and Do. Subtracting 
the supply.curve from the demand curve yields the excess 
demand curve, EDo. ESo is the world excess supply curve. 
The domestic target price to be achieved by use of 
quotas is PT. In the absence of U.S. interference in the 
sugar market world price would be Po. Under free trade, 
u.s. production would be ose, consumption would be oae, and 
imports would be oae-ose which equals 0-Qfo in Figure lla. 
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The u.s. quota is db, which equals o•-QdO and also 0-Qo 
in Figure lla. World price is Pq, and the price premium 
between the u.s. and world prices is PTPq. 
The quota would cost domestic consumers PoabPT and 
benefit domestic producers PocdPT. Quota holders would 
benefit by receiving quota rents of ghbd, which equ~ls 
PqrsPT. There is a net loss to the U.S., measured by the 
gain to producers minus the loss to consumers, PocdPT 
PoabPt. The rest of the world can either gain or lose, since 
their gain of PqrsPT is offset by a loss of PqrnPo. 
Equivalent Tariff 
If the u.s. replaced the quota with an equivalent 
tariff, domestic producers and consumers would not be 
affected. However, the U.S. government would collect tariff 
revenue of ghbd, which previously would have gone to foreign 
sugar suppliers as quota rents. The net loss to the U.S. 
would be cabd - ghbd, which could be a positive or negative 
' ' 
amount. The welfare loss under a tariff is significantly 
less than the loss, cabd, under the quota. 
~-~---
Deficiency Payment 
Under a deficiency payment scheme, the government would 
guarantee the price P'~' to producers, but !.~!-~.9J!§Umers fa~ 
'----·--""···---
the market price. Assuming that the price PT is the supply-
inducing price, the domestic supply curve would be vertical 
at Q 5 up to P'~', and follow So above P'~'. The excess demand 
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curve would be EDd below PT and EDo above PT. World price 
would fall below Po to Pd. Consumers would benefit by 
PdkaPa, as they would face the lower world price and consume 
a larger quantity. Producers would benefit by PocdPT, as 
before. · Taxpayers would lose PdjdPT. The net gain of the 
deficiency payment compared to a free market situation would 
be jkaf - cfd. 
Comparing the deficiency payment with the quota, it is 
clear that the quota is the most expensive program. To 
benefit producers by the amount PocdPT under the quota, the 
country loses the amount cabd. To give producers the same 
benefit with a deficiency payment, the country loses cfd -
jkaf. 
Welfare Effects With Corn Sweetener Substitution 
Using the concept of equilibrium demand curves described 
in the first section it is possible to investigate the 
welfare implications of the substitution of corn sweeteners 
for sugar. In Figure 12, the demand curve Dl is the sugar 
demand curve given that corn sweetener substitution has 
occurred. o• is the one-year general equilibrium demand 
curve for the n+l-year length of run of the analysis, during 
which time the (administratively determined) sugar price of 
PT has induced corn sweetener substitution and thus shifted 
the demand for sugar inward. 
The quota must now be reduced to db', or o~-Qdl, which 
equals OQl in Figure 12a. World price falls to Plw. The 
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welfare loss of the related industries can be measured in the 
sugar market diagram using the assumptions underlying o•. 
(
'Therefore, the consumer surplus loss is Poab'PT, compared to 
PoabPT had there been no corn sweetener substitution. 
Producer gain is still PocdPT. Quota rent to foreign 
suppliers is lmb'd. The net cost of a quota is cab'd. An 
equivalent tariff would transfer the quota rent, lmb'd, to 
the u.s. government, leave producers and consumers 
unaffected, and result in a net loss to the u.s. of cab'd -
lmb'd, which again could be positive or negative. 
Small Country AsSUmption 
Given uncertainty about the elasticity of world sugar 
excess supply facing the u.s., the case of an infinitely 
elastic world excess supply curve is also analyzed. A 
-- ------~......, 
constant world price facing the U.S. for sugar imports is 
particularly relevant for short-run analysis. Figure 13 
shows the world and U.S. sugar markets for the case of a 
constant world price. 
Assuming HFCS substitution, a quota of db would result 
in consumer loss of Pwab'PT, producer gain of PwcdPT, and net 
U.S. loss of cab'd. Quota rent would be grnb'd, and quota 
premium would be PTPw. 
An equivalent tariff would not change the results for 
producers and consumers but would yield tariff revenue ghbd 
to the government. Net social loss would be cabd - ghbd. 
Under a deficiency payment program the u.s. sugar price 
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would be the same as .the world price, and it is likely that 
HFCS substitution would not have occurred. A deficiency 
payment program to give producers price pT would cost 
taxpayers PwgdPT. Producers would benefit PwcdPT. Consumers 
would be unaffected, as they would continue to buy at the 
unchanged world price. Imports, ga, are greater than under a 
quota. Net welfare loss the u.s. would be cgd. 
Random Coefficients Model Estimation 
The assumptions underlying analysis of time series data, r 
I particularly the assumption that the coefficients are fixed or stable over the entire time period, has been a topic of 
considerable debate. For example, are consumers equally 
1 
\ 
\ 
responsive to a change in the price of sugar in 1988 as they 
were in 1980 or 1960? And are producers of sugar equally 
responsive to a change in the price of sugar at different I 
times? 
It is quite likely that a consumer's response to a price 
change will be affected by many other factors. When major 
events affect large numbers of people, the aggregate markets 
are affected. Dummy variables are often included to account 
for war, recessions, and other major shocks. On the supply 
side, technological change could result in sharply differing 
~·"---~·--·-· 
supply responses, by individual producers or by ~~ entire 
- ..• -·-·--·-...---~~ ---
sector. Institutional changes such as changing government 
"'-""'~-----.----~'-... --~----~--... -· -· 
price support policies will also condition the supply 
~~-....----..-~----------------~------.. ~ ·- ~··-·~---. --- .... ----~-·-· ___ .,,_._p~...._~~ ... --~ 
response. Again, techniques such as dummy variables or 
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switching regressions (see for example Judge et.al. 1985, p. 
529) have been used to account for these shocks. 
Alternative methods for accounting for changes in 
parameters have been evaluated. Random coefficient models 
have been proposed and estimated. Swamy, Conway and LeBlanc 
(1988a) (hereafter SCL) ·cite the following six reasons why 
random coefficient models may be theoretically and 
empirically superior to traditional fixed coefficient models. 
First, the underlying process which generates the 
coefficients could be a time-varying or npn-stationary random 
-~---------~-
~~Q~~ This is in contrast to most models in the physical 
sciences. For example, the physicist who attempts to measure 
the gravitational constant or the speed of light is searching 
for a parameter which is assumed to have a "true" value which 
does not vary over time. The economist who attempts to 
\ 
measure the elasticity of demand has more reason to suspect. ). 
time-varying than that it 1s that the parameter is random and 
a fundamental constant of nature. 
Second, SCL point out that "omitted variables that 
exhibit nonstationary behaviour and that are not orthogonal 
to the included variables can induce variability in the 
coefficients of the included var~,bles."(page 3). 
Third, the use of proxy variables could introduce non-
stationarity. Even if the true model was stationary, it 
would be possible for the relationship between the proxy 
variable and the true variable to change over time. Most 
economic models contain proxy variables. 
49 
Fourth, aggregation could induce non-stationarity. "It 
is highly restrictive to assume the aggregation weights of 
microunits will not change over time ••• (and) There are surely 
few observed events that are not already the outcome of some 
aggregation."(page 3). Swamyet. al. give a proof that with 
aggregation in a regression model with a disturbance term, 
the conditions for the stochastic convergence of the 
disturbance term to zero are less stringent if the model 
allows for random coefficients than if it does not. If the 
stochastic coefficients model could exist under a broader set 
of conditions than the fixed coefficients model, it should be 
included in the economist's tool kit. "For any practical j' 
work, the existence conditions are important because a model . 
that does not exist could not have generated our data and 
/ 
should not be used for empirical analysis." (page 4). 
Fifth, incorrect functional form may justify a 
stochastic coefficients specification, as already alluded to 
above. Since economists usually do not know the •true' 
functional forms of their models, a more flexible form could 
allow for more accurate estimation. Swamy et. al. quote 
Rausser, Hundlak and Johnson(l983); " The approximation of 
highly nonlinear •true' relationships by simpler functional 
forms, along with observations outside the narrow sample 
range, provides perhaps the strongest motivation for a 
varying parameter structure." 
Sixth,. the rational expectations literature has raised 
questions about economic models which forces· consideration of 
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framework of optimizing 
Economic theory is built upon a 11 
behaviour by agents, whose decisions 
stochastic parameters. 
I If some change in are conditioned by their environment. policy or an institution occurs, agents may adopt new 
decision rules, which may in turn lead to a new micro or 
macro economic structure. 
Several random coefficient and time-varying parameter 
models were considered. The Hildreth-Houck model, widely 
used in the agricultural economics literature, does not allow 
for any permanent trend in parameter variation and is better 
suited to cross-sectional analysis than time series analysis. 
One of the widely used random coefficients models is the 
Cooley-Prescott model, described in detail in Appendix A. It 
allows for coefficient variation to be either permanent or 
transitory. It is a flexible model which includes other 
random coefficient models as special cases, including the 
traditional random coefficient model and the adaptive 
regression model. 
I 
i 
I 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF U.S. SUGAR 
DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
I do not know if coffee and sugar are 
essential to the happiness of Europe, but I 
know well that these two products have 
accounted for the unhappiness of two great 
regions of the world: America has been 
depopulated so as to have land on which to 
plant them; Africa has been depopulated so as 
to have the people to cultivate them. 
From Vol. 1 of J.H. Bernadin ed Saint Pierre's Voyage to Isle 
de France, Isle de Bourbon, The Cape of Good Hope ... With New 
Observations on Nature and mankind by an Officer of the 
King(1773). Quoted in Mintz(1985, p. 29). 
The above quotation emphasizes the importance that has 
been placed upon access to sugar throughout recent history. 
Little has changed from colonial times up to the present, in 
the sense that governments still intervene in a major way in 
the determination of sugar demand and supply. This fact 
complicates and perhaps makes more challenging economic 
analysis of sugar markets. 
In this chapter a review of recent U.S. sugar supply and 
demand studies will be made, followed by an empirical estimate 
of 1987 U.S. supply and demand. 
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u.s. Sugar Demand 
Previous Studies 
A recent estimate of U.S. sugar demand was made by Leu 
et. al. (1987). Using annual data from 1963-83, the estimated 
equation, after adjusting for autocorrelation, is: 
Q = 111.84 - 0.3288 Pt - 0.4192 Pt-1 
(15.18) (-4.76) (-6.15) 
+ 0.4759 MIXPt-1 
(2.92) 
-1.1638 T 
(-2.39) 
( 4 .1) 
R2 = .98 
where Qt is per capita consumption for refined sugar, Pt is 
United State~ deflated by the consumer price index ~-~~-6 _ _?._~_!-_g_~_l_, 
Pt-1 is price lagged one year, MIXPt-1 is the arithmetic mean 
·-~·'·~--- .. --··-~ .... __ .... _ ... , ___ .... __ "_ 
of prices of HFCS, glucose and dextrose weighted by their 
consumption quanti~ies and lagged one year, and T is a trend 
' _,.~"--•·- ····-·-·_,.,..,__,,.,._ 
variable. The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
Estimation of U.S. Sugar Demand 
USDA personnel have indicated that the Northeast 
wholesale price is not as accurate as the, ~-~!sag£:-We.§_! 
wholesale refined beet sugar price, which was thus chosen as 
the best single representative price for the U.S. market. 
Sugar is purchased in refined form mostly by manufacturers who 
put it in various food products, and so the producer price 
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index was used to adjust for inflation. 
Since data on HFCS are only available back to !!.!Q-i~t-i§.._ 
tempting to utilize data on glucose and dextrose in order to 
extend the analysis further back in time, as done by Leu et. 
al. However, glucose and dextrose are not equivalent to HFCS 
as sugar substitutes, and since one pu~pose of this study is 
to capture the effects of HFCS substitu~JorLfo~; ~J~9~;r., only 
the time period since HFCS became available (1970 to present) 
----~ --·--·---M~---·---------~---·----~-- ... - .... ~·------~-..-... ____ ,..~-------,_.,.,,_-~ .... -"----~-... -""--.......__. 
is utilized. 
Attempting to use the price of HFCS as a regressor 
resulted in an equation whose parameters were not stable with 
respect to alternative time 2_er1~»_g_s. USDA officials who have 
---
worked with HFCS price series ( Langley and Barry, personal 
communication) have concluded that the HFCS industry structure 
is such tha~-- the_pn~~--9.l_I!FCS ... 1~t .. ~-@~.~r~f.nf!_(!,_"l~r<:{~_~Y-~.¥ 
producers who set it at a discount to the sugar price, rather 
----->1- 0 --~--,~-·----~-~-..... ,....,,..,, o •• ,,,, .... ,,.,~,·-~--•-••"'""'W'OdO-'", ...... 
than by competitive market J9J:.~~s. A study by Ives and Hurley 
.......... -~~ ... -..,~··· .......... ...-·'• .. . ' . 
(1988) found the price of HFCS to be closely correlated with 
~ ... .._ _ ___... .......... ,.~ ... -~--*-......-...... ,._ .... ,., ----~--... ·-~~. 
the price of sugar. And the correlation coefficient between 
__.--.~~-~-~---·--~ ... --
the price of HFCS-42,and Chicago-West wholesale sugar price 
from 1975 to 1987 is 0.87. Thus the price of HFCS was not 
included. The per capita consumption of HFCS was found to be 
the best shifter for tl!E!~-~\J.9.§l,.~---~d.E!~.E~.~~~.~ion. 
An income variable is often used in demand estimation. 
However, the income elasticity of demand for sugar has been 
_.-e--~~-,--.-------~ ...... _ •.....,,., .. ~~-~--,.,..--.-.... ---...-.. ~---
estimated by others (de Vries, FOA) to be very close to zero 
'""' '-" --~ .. ,__-.._, . ...,..,.., .. -·~ .. ----..,. 
for the United States. Therefore, no income variable was 
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included. 
For theoretical reasons, the demand for sugar was 
estimated on a per capita basis. Annual data are used due to 
the lack of consumption data series reported in other 
frequencies. The price used is lagged due to the fact that 
most sugar is purchased far in advance by large firms using it 
as an input in some production process. 
,,c,_, ___ .. -~·--·-... --·-~-----.. ,,_._ ·•-'""~• ..... • 
Ordinary Least Sguares Estimation. Using data from 1970 
to 1987, the results were: 
Q = 106.98 -.525 P(-1) -.92 HFCS (4.2) 
(2.13) (.16) (.035) 
Durbin Watson Statistic = 1.8 
Adjusted R• = • 98 
where Q is u.s. per capita consumption of refined sugar per 
year, P(-1) is the Chicago~West P-_!=ic! of beet sugar lagged one 
year, and HFCS is the u.s. annu~l per ca,pl.t,ca_consumption of 
.. -~. --- • ·- . ..,.""' __ ,_, ~ ···-- ..-.. - ...... - ,~ ....... , _ _. -~-·--··~--_.....;.,.:-. .• ..,.; .. ;;z;;;;::c:;:..:;;.:_;;:;;~~,~;-"W~.._ .. .,.._........,.,.,.,."""'·' .. -""'>& .. - .... .,.,"""''--~'~ ... 
HFCS-42 and HFCS-55. standard errors are in parentheses. The 
---w-~. ,....__ ----- ,,... __ _..._ --~·-
estimated elasticity of demand at the means was -0.06, which 
is quite low. 
Cooley-Prescott Model Estimation. The Cooley-Prescott 
model was run using the same data set as above for OLS. This 
model will hereafter be referred to as the TVP (Time Varying 
Parameters) model. The estimated value of Y, the parameter 
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which indicates the fraction of temporary and permanent 
variation (see Appendix A) was zero. The parameter values and 
standard errors derived from OLS and Cooley-Prescott are 
almost identical so that the Cooley-Prescott results are not 
reported. The coefficient on the price variable indicates 
that for each increase in sugar price o~_! cent per pound, per 
capita consumption falls by about half a pound per year. The 
------..--...... -------·---
coefficient on the HFCS variable in equation (4.7) indicates 
t.t~·~ . 
that for each one pound increase in HFCS consumption, sugar 
consumption falls by .92 pounds, which means that each 
increase of one pound in per capita consumption of HFCS 
displaces almost a pound of sugar. The demand equation was 
very stable with respect to extending or reducing the sample 
period. 
u.s. Sugar Supply 
Previous Studies 
Sugar supply theoretically depends upon the price of 
·--~ ... ,. .. ---.,.......-
_;;_qgar, cos1:_~_QlJ~~~~~-~S'!:J.~n, and ot~er._y~r.!.~l:?l.!ts • A great deal 
of aggregation is necessary in any estimation of such an 
equation. Leong (1985) estimated an aggregate U.S. sugar 
supply function using annual data for 1955 through 1981: 
.. ~--"'"''~- .... --...~-----------
QS = 3000.8 + 158.19 P(t-2) - 28.12 FERT(-2) 
+183.94 T +50.14 Z*FERT(-2) ( 4 . 4 ) 
where QS is u.s. raw sugar supply in thousand short tons, P(t-
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2) is ~etail suga~ p~ice lagged two pe~iods, FERT(-2) is 
fertilizer price lag_9ed two periods, T is technology (sic), z 
~ -~-~~~~--~-~------~-~---~-~ --~~-~- ---
is a ze~o-one dummy variable which is equal to one fo~ the 
"f~ee market" period of 1974-81, and Z*FERT is a slope shifter 
on the fertilizer p~ice parameter. The estimated supply 
elasticity is .4805. 
Leong also repo~ted a double logarithm supply function 
estimated over the same time period with lagged supply as a 
predetermined variable: 
LNQS = 3.8664 +.4907 LNQSLAG +.1636 LNRETLG 
-.1224 LNFERL2 -.1527 LNPWAGE +.2667 LT 
-.0157 ZLRETLG (4.5} 
where the LN prefix signifies the natural log of the variable. 
QS is U.S raw sugar supply in thousand short tons, QSLAG is QS 
lagged one period, RETLG is the retail sugar price lagged two 
-,,.,_.,,,., __....,.. -
pe_~Jgg~.~_._.,FERL2 is the f!~-~-~~--~~~-~-:.....g~!-~_: ____ ~~gg~-~-~-"!.~-~22-s, 
PWAGE is the wage ~ate lagged two periods, LT is the natu~al 
log of the technology variable, and ZLRETLG is the natu~al log 
of the slope shifter variable, as in equation (4.2). The 
partial adjustment specification allows calculation of short-
run and long-run p~ice elasticities, which were ~epo~ted as 
.1636 and .3213, ~espectively. Leong concluded on the basis 
of low t-statistics that the coefficients on the LNFERL2 and 
ZLRETLG variables were not diffe~ent f~om ~~~!..Q ... at the 5 
-----·-···-·-.-~- --· 
percent significance level. 
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Leu. et. al. (1987) reported a u.s. sugar supply function 
derived from the work of Gemmill (1976). Gemmill had 
estimated separate sugar supply equations for four cane 
producing areas ( Hawaii, Florida, Louisiana and Texas) and 
for continental beet production. These five equations were 
aggregated by Leu et. al. into a single U.S. sugar supply 
equation. The price elasticity of supply estimated by 
Gemmill was approximately 2.0. 
Estimated supply (and demand) elasticities often vary 
widely in economics, depending upon the time period selected ; 
.-.. ___ ,_.,..~"">.-----·-~·--- I 
1 
The range from Leong's i 
estimate of • 4_E!05 ~~-emmi!-_!_~~--E!_~~~~~-:_()_~--~-:0 is wide enough l 
to result in significantly different policy C()nclusionf5, ;\. 
depending on which elastic! ty is used. For the purposes of 1 
this study differing supply elasticities would affect the ~ 
I 
I transfers to sugar prp_Qy,e;ers and users, if the extremes of .--. ......... ---- -----~ .... - ...... ___ _..__ .... ~.....,--zero and infinite elasticity of supply az:.e..-~?C~!gg~g. 
<t"''••A,_-..,,,-,," ' ' --· --··· ---''•• 
Estimation of u.s. Sugar Supply 
From economic theory the best determinants of sugar 
supply are the supply price per~~~Y-~QL~c~rs and the 
'"······-·'"··--"' 
cost of production. The Chicago-West price of refined beet 
sugar was chosen as the single price series which reflects 
.... --·······-·•"'''---~-,.--. ··---~----
most closely the actual_ ~z:ice fa<::"!~--~:¥._p:J:'oduc~ .. ~! .. (after 
discussions with USDA personnel knowledgeable about the sugar 
industry). It is necessary to keep the price used in supply 
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and demand estimation consistent in order to perform the 
welfare analysis of Chapter V. 
Fertilizer expense constitutes the single largest 
variable cost item for both cane and beet sugar producers. 
The particular blends of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium 
are so varied among regions and producers that the overall · 
fertilizer price index published by the USDA was selected as 
1
1' 
the best proxy for the cost of inputs in sugar production. 
Determining the appropriate lag on supply price was 
necessarily a compromise, due to the nature of aggregation in 
the supply function. Cane producers must commit to production 
by planting the "ratoon" about eighteen months befq:r;Et,..j:;he 
'·----~..co:,.,.;..t>,~.J~.....__~-..~. ... ,';Jd:~:;.a~.;t.;:7..._. ___ .,. 
first harvest, and the cane field will be harvested several ·-- . ., . ······ .. " .......... -'"~"'"""•··· '··· ........ .,.,.,, 
times over a .~urther period of several years before it is 
•.• -~·---·._..,.,.._, ,--~----·---·-·"-•"-"''·_. ... , ... ,___ ··---- +<"••' ---~--<----- '····-··-,.~~----~- .~---·..._,.,..,....... ... ,. ''""""' ............. ~~-"-~ ...... --··--~--------~---"'->'• 
plowed up. Beet producers can adjust their acreage and 
-~-
planting decisions in the spring, with harvest coming in the 
fall, so that a much shorter production response to price is 
... "-..,_ .,.._._ "'·"~·- ".._,,._,.,..._,."",'--.... .,............, .... ,......., .... _,.. .. ~-... -.~--------"'~""""''--~ 
possible. A one year lag on price was selected as the best 
specification to capture the behaviour of aggregate sugar 
supply response. Annual data are used to keep the SEJ>J?..!Y.: .. ...SJld 
··--------~ .. ---·-..... ·--
demand specifications consistent,, 
_....,_,_,_, .• ,.._...,_..,_, .. ._ .• ~ ... ~ • ._ . ._ "·-·"~" """" •- _,. --. ' .• · •,r -.. _, 
_...-.-"r" 
There is no problem of joint determination of quantity 
and price in this market, because the price of sugar was set 
...... ··-··. _, --·~-"--"'' ,. . .. , .. ·-'· ""' . ·-·. '·- ·---·-·--.-. ..,..--., .. 
exogenously as a policy variable during most of the years of 
the sample. Even during 1975-81, which was a period of 
- .. --··-·--·~-- ...... ---
nominally "free market" U.S. sugar policy, there was always 
,.,.,, •... ,, ___ ...... .....,__.,_...,........,~.------
the threat of policy intez:y~n.ti~on., in the even~- C>,~ "-~~,~.?rld 
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price drop. When world prices fell in 1981, u.s. quotas were 
quickly reinstated. 
Ordinary Least Squares. Using data from 1970 to 1987, 
initial OLS equation results were (standard errors in 
parentheses): 
QS = -310227.8 + 131.75 P(-1) - 7.88 PF + 159.81 TR (4.6) 
(54585.9) (22.1) (1.57) (27.77) 
Adjusted Ra = .71 
Durbin Watson Statistic = 2.65 
where QS is u.s. domestic sugar production in thousand metric 
tons, refined basis, P(-1) is the Chicago-West wholesale beet 
sugar price divided by the Producer Price Index and lagged one 
period, PF is the Fertilizer Price Index, and TR is a trend 
variable set to the value of the year (1971, 1972, etc.). 
All t-statistics are above 5. The adjusted Rt is .71, 
indicating that about 71 percent of the variation in annual 
sugar supply is explained by the included regressors. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic provides a way of testing for 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Under the null hypothesis 
of negative autocorrelation, the calculated Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 2.65 leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 5 percent significance level. ~\ 
---- ·, \ -\, <..t I 
The coefficients in 14.4))indicate that for each one cent 
.. ~~ 
increase in the real price of sugar, producers increase 
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production by about 131 thousand metric tons, while for each 
one point increase in the fertilizer price index, producers· 
decrease production by about 7.88 thousand metric tons. The 
trend variable is clearly picking up influences of other 
variables not included as regressors in the equation, which 
are estimated to be increasing sugar production at the rate of 
about 159 thousand metric tons per year. 
Cooley-Prescott Model. The Cooley-Prescott model was 
estimated with the same variables and data as above, except 
that the trend variable was not included. Results are shown 
in Table 10. The estimated value of Y, which is a parameter 
ranging between zero and one which estimates the allocation of 
~,,_..,,, ... -- '-'~ """"'-"'''""-• "'-'- . .._.,..,..,..,. .• ·-~·-k'' ..... "'""'·'""' .c,., 
t~manent and _!:_,ansi tory components of parameter 
variation, is 0.78. This indicates that a substantial 
fraction of parameter variation is permanent over time • 
.,... .. - ---·~ 
Figures 14, 15 and 16 show the estimated permanent components 
of the parameters. 
The permanent component of the intercept increases almost 
continuously over the sample period, as shown in Figure 14. 
The intercept in 1971 is 4.4 million metric tons, refined 
basis, and rises to almost 5.5 million metric tons in 1987. 
The coefficient on sugar price is seen in Figure 15, and shows 
substantial movement up and down. There is a downward trend 
from 1971 to 1983, when a dramatic upward trend begins. In 
Figure 16 the coefficient on the fertilizer price index is 
shown. Since this coefficient is negative, its upward trend 
is moving it closer to zero. It changes from about -2.5 in 
T~LE 10 
SUPPLY COEFFICIENTS AND ELASTICITY, 
COOLEY-PRESCOTT HODEL 
----------Coefficient------- Supply 
Intercept Sugar Fertilizer Elasticity 
Year Price Price 
Index 
1971 4497.872 95.461 -2.534 0.199 
1972 4599.751 99.235 -2.437 0.207 
1973 4414.952 92.243 -2.621 0.192 
1974 4410.953 91.952 -2.612 0.192 
1975 4525.143 95.878 -2.398 0.200 
1976 4586.262 95.553 -2.304 0.199 
1977 4618.379 93.405 -2.266 0.195 
1978 4709.591 93.412 -2.116 0.195 
1979 4639.030 88.471 -2.270 0.184 
1980 4777.762 90.962 -1.999 0.190 
1981 4759.158 88.212 -2.125 0.184 
1982 4788.591 88.204 -2.121 0.184 
1983 4791.059 87.155 -2.190 0.182 
1984 4913.651 90.454 -1.950 0.188 
1985 5014.807 93.030 -1.767 0.194 
1986 5262.722 100.376 -1.212 0.209 
1987 5472.161 106.602 -0.747 0.222 
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Figure 15. TVP Sugar Price Coefficient From TVP Supply Estimation, 1971-87 
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1971 to -0.7 in 1987. 
In Figure 17 the coefficients for sugar price and the 
fertilizer price index are shown on a normalized scale, to 
illustrate their variation relative to their means. The ~ 
largest deviation for both series is in the period since 198~, 
when supply has become more responsive to sugar price and le~s 
\ 
responsive to the fertilizer price index. 
The elasticity of supply is given in Table 10. 
calculated at the means of price and quantity, it averages 
about .20, and is relatively constant. The low value is .181 
in 1983, and the high is .222 for 1987. 
A trend variable, such as in the initial OLS supply 
equation, is a proxy for a number of variables influencing the 
market over time. In the TVP model, these factors are 
reflected in the intercept. As Figure 14 shows, the intercept 
is not stable over the sample period. From 1971 to 1983, the 
intercept trended upward, but irregularly and not 
dramatically. The percentage increase in the intercept from 
1971 to 1983 is about 6.5 percent, or only 0.5 percent per 
year. However, in the four years from 1983 to 1987 the 
intercept increased by 14.2 percent, or about 3.5 percent per 
year. 
The year 1983 is also a turning point for the other 
coefficients. From 1971 to 1983 the sugar price coefficient 
falls 8.7 percent, or about .7 percent per year, while from 
1983 to 1987 it rises 22.2 percent, or 5.6 percent per year. 
The fertilizer index coefficient declines 13.6 percent from 
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1971 to 1983, which is a rate of about 1.1 percent per year. 
But from 1983 to 1987 it declines 6~ percent, or about 16 
percent per year. These coefficient shifts indicate that the 
U.S. sugar supply function is shifting outward·, becoming more 
_.....---·--"'--."'-·'··-........ _ , .... ,_, . .,~ . ..- ---~---·----~--- ... -~·-..... ·~------""'-"""-· --""'"""""''' ..... -
responsive to sugar pr!ce, and less responsive to fertilizer 
- --~ "'"-.-... ,~-~---
price. 
-----
"'"" --·----"-'"''"""'-'''""'~-~---- __ ,.,,...,~-.--.... -........... , ... ~ .... ~"'"'"•• .. -.. ·..-.~-... 
An increase in sugar output is not by itself an 
indication of a supply shift, since it is possible for the 
supply response to lag many years behind the price stimulus. 
-------~--~ ... ·-~ 
Economic theory indicates that the effect of a change in own 
•• ,_, ___ , ..... ,..,,>i', .. ..,,.,.., .... ,... .... ..__.,..,,,._.......,_.....,_.-._~-...,.- .............. ~, .... " ••.. "'_,_,~~.,..-
price ar.e ... ~~.~:_~sE~e..~-.. ~X .. ~ .. f;P~ng~ . .in quantity su~plied a~.c:>.~g a 
stable supply curve. Thus, theory would seem to rule out the 
price of sugar , be~ 119 .... ~ __ .£C;tY.~!L oJ ... C;t s.}l ~-~ ~ ,_!, ~ ..•. ~J:!.<l~~~ ·~~.~.P.,~u~l· 
But in Chapter III it was shown how a policy-controlled 
change in the price of a good could, un~.~~ _£!!'t.~J!:! ... ~.Q!lQ.!~.!2.~.~/ 
____ ... _____ ,.,..._.~:-~-~ ... --....... ,_. ___ ~_.-.. .. , .. ___ _ 
result in a shltt .. .9 .. {.,J:J:t..~".demand curve. It is useful to test 
.... -~- ·'"'·"-'<-~i,.l,:,.-'••o;:,;·· ,,_._,_.,..;tc,-~·,··~•·l'lil.-
an application of this same theory on the supply side of 
~------,·------""""'"'"-----·---'""""""" ....... , ____ .. _.,_~~""'"--~-..-.,-... _- ~ ..... -·--___..--
sugar. 
The discussion of Chapter III illustrated horizontally 
related goods, but a similar result is possible with 
vertically related goods (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, Chapter 9) 
and is illustrated in Figure 18. Figure 18a shows the sugar 
I 
market, and Figure 18b shows the market for some input used by I 
the sugar industry. The following conditions are necessary in 
order for welfare consequences of a policy-induced price 
change to be calculated: 
1) The sugar industry is competitive and the demand for 
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s~gar is perfectly elastic 
2) Input B is the only input the sugar industry uses 
3) Industry B is competitive and faces perfectly elastic 
supply of its inputs 
These assumptions effectively isolate the markets for sugar 
and its input from the rest of the economy and allow the 
effect of a policy-set price change to be precisely 
calculated. 
Initially the p:r:ice of sugar: is P&, which is raised by 
policy to Pi. Sugar suppliers attempt to raise output from 
Qi to Qi. But the demand for the input, initially Da(Pi), 
increases to Da(Pi) due to the dependence of the derived 
demand for the input on sugar output. The resulting price 
increase in the input market from Pi to Pi shifts the sugar 
supply curve from SA(Pi) to SA(Pi), and after these effects 
have worked through the system, sugar output falls to Qi 
instead of increasing to Qi. 
This analysis would indicate that the most obvious 
theoretical result of the high sugar support price of the 
1980s should be an inward shift of sugar supp~y, which is the 
opposite of the TVP model results. 
If the supply of the input were to shift, as from Si to 
Si in Figure 18, then the resulting decrease in input price 
from PB to Pi could result in an outward movement of sugar 
supply from SA(Pi) to SA(Pi). However, this violates 
assumption (3) above; the price of the inputs used by the 
sugar input industry must not change. 
Thus the equilibrium model, which is useful in 
demonstrating welfare effects of sugar policy on the demand 
side, cannot be used on the supply side. No equilibrium 
supply curve such as s• in Figure 18 can be calculated. 
However, for any year of interest, a unique supply curve is 
given by the TVP model. 
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Changes in costs can be a cause of shifts in supply 
functions. Production and processing costs for refined beet 
sugar fell between 1982 and 1985 from 25.518 to 21.034 cents 
per pound (USDA Sugar and· Sweetener Report) • For raw cane 
sugar, the corresponding costs were 21.533 and 20.55 cents per 
pound (however, when costs of refining raw sugar of 4-6 cents 
per pound are included, the estimated cost of production for 
cane sugar exceeds that of refined beet sugar). But the 
parameter on the fertilizer price index appears to capture 
these production cost movements fairly well. 
It is of some interest to note parallels between the 
sugar market and other agricultural markets of the early 
1980s •. Trends in the sugar market are paralleled to some 
extent in other agricultural markets such as corn and wheat. 
Many researchers have argued that high, guaranteed price 
supports of the 1981 legislation caused "overproduction" of 
grains, leading to excessive stockpiling by the CCC. In the 
1985 farm legislation, discretionary power to lower the loan 
rates and support prices for corn and wheat was given to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, and this power was utilized in an 
attempt to regain export market share. Since the U.S has a 
\ 
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deficit of sugar and has never been a net exporter of sugar, 
there was no lobbying in 1985 for lower sugar loan rates as a 
way of regaining export market ~hare. The 1985 farm bill, far 
from decreasing sugar loan rates, requires that if the 
Secretary of Agriculture determines that the support price for 
any crop year from 1986-90 should n2t be increased, he must 
submit a report justifying his determination to the Committee 
on Agriculture of the u.s. House of Representatives and the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (USDA, 
Suqar and Sweetener Report, March 1988). 
The above considerations lead to the conclusion that 
although no definite cause of shifts in sugar supply can be 
identified, there is at least suggestive evidence from the TVP 
model that shifts have occurred, especially since 1983. 
In the next chapter, welfare coz:tsequences of the 
indicated shifts in supply and demand will be calculated. 
CHAPTER V 
WELFARE COMPARISONS OF ALTERNATIVE 
U.S. SUGAR POLICIES 
This chapter will utilize the conceptual framework of 
Chapter III and the empirical results of Chapter IV to assess 
the welfare consequences of the current u.s. sugar quotas, and 
to compare the current policy with an equivalent tariff and a 
deficiency payment program. A spreadsheet model is used to 
calculate measures of producer and consumer surpl~§..,_usulting 
--- _'"""""""'_' __ _..., 
from alternative policies. A forecast of some consequences of 
continuation of current policy for the next two years will be 
made, with particular reference to trade consequences. 
Methodology and Assumptions 
In order to estimate the welfare effects of the U.S. 
sugar program, a border price for imported sugar must be 
a1 na•ll P• • -II!. CWI!i! ..... 
assumed. There is no consensus on an appropriate world sugar 
rice. Most analysts agree that the world raw sugar price 
quoted on the New York exchange is not a representative "free 
market" price, since virtually every government subsidizes its 
sugar industry and dumps excess supplies on the world market. 
In recent years the quoted world price has ranged from 29 
cents in 1980 to 4 cents in 1985. The 29 cent 1980 price was a 
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short-run "shortage" price, and not likely a possible long-run 
equilibrium price. The low prices since 1985 are considered 
by many to also be disequilibrium prices, but chronic excess 
supply at government-set prices in most countries has in the 
past led to extended periods of low world prices. In 8 of the 
---- -·--~-----····~--~._,_ _____ . ----~---.... --~·., ...... --...,. .. _, ···-~--'-.... " .... ___....,..~ 
last 10 years, the world price has been below 10 cents. Many 
---------.._......_--., _____ _
analysts suggest a world free trade price would be between 10 
and 15 cents (Hoff et. al., 1987). This study will 
~--... ---""'' 
demonstrate welfare impacts under three alternative world 
price levels, rather than taking a point estimate of a true 
·••• • •• ~_,u,.,,..,..,,.,.~-·•>.-~~4'".._.....,,-..,.-,_....---.,_e, 
world prig.~_,. 
-,""'' The current Market Stabilization Price for sugar is about 
22 cents, 4 cents above the loan rate of 18 cents. The 
domestic raw sugar price (New York No. 14, c.i.f. duty-paid) 
has in recent years been very close to the MSP, between 21 
------------------
and 22 cents. 
--------
Taking the U.S. target price fo:r;"_E~w ~-~!l.E_as 
22 cents, and using comparisons on a raw sugar basis as is 
--- ,, ... _ . .-------~-·-------·----------.-.-~---~----~----~---------
usually done i_rt_the wgr:J.g markets, alternative hypothetical 
_ __..-~-~- _. ... ~--· - -- ___ ,. _____ .. __ .... _ 
world prices of 17, 12, and 7 cents would correspond to u.s. 
r~!~ugar price premia of 5, 10 and 15 cents, respectively. 
-· ---.... ______ ~-------""--··---~....._ .. ,,.._~MO,..,_,._, ___ +'••.-••-""-~··"'~·-•' ·----~---·- ... ~---~'"0•'•-··--•-o,,,.._,, ____ ... o 
There is no need to consider transportation charges since the 
relevant world price is a landed u.s. price for world sugar. 
sugar prices into a wholesale refined measure, the raw price 
-----~---------------...---------..... -"~---
premia of 5, 10, and 15 cents are multiplied by 1.07 to 
-----
convert t~_:ef!E~-~--~~5l~E __ J?! ... ~!!'_!_~"..?..~--~~-~~5, 10.7 and 16.05 cents, 
~-··,.--
respectively. These represent the gap between U.S. and world 
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refined wholesale prices. In recent years a New York raw 
price of 22 cents would correspond approximately to a 24 cent 
Chicago wholesale refined price. Alternative world prices are 
calculated by subtracting the refined premia from 24 cents, 
which yields estimates of 18.65, 13.3 and 7.95 cents. 
Current sugar policy includes a small tariff, the effect 
of which is subsumed in the analysis of the quota system which 
follows since the tariff effects are negligible compared to 
the quota effects. In the analysis of an equivalent tariff, 
it is assumed that the equivalent tariff replaces the current 
~ ys ter_n_ _g_;_~~~d ~-~~~~--~~-:r:! _fX. _ 
The "consumer" in the estimated demand curve for this 
analysis is t~i~~· Estimates of sugar user 
CU)d ~~~!91-,~-Q.~J~l welfare losses would be higher if retail 
ltoj.'\:. .~ ... .,.,~'' "'~'~'-' .• -~" '>: ....... ;.,,_.,.,.,, --..... .._,,,-.: ... ~ .......... ~ .... -~-;,;;.Y.""-... 
prices were used in the estimation. However, welfare measures 
based on profit-maximizing firm behaviour are more 
theoretically sound than consumer welfa_:_~-!!!~.~_:;u__:_:: ____ ~~i:h ~ I 
based on utility maximization assumptions. Also, retail 
prices are not as appropriate as wholesale prices for sugar as 
explained in Chapter IV. 
Two estimates of the world excess supply elasticity \ 
facing the U.S. will be used. If the analysis is short run, 
or the U.S. is considered to be a small country with respect 
to world sugar trade, an infinite elasticity is appropriate. 
If U.S. sugar trade is presumed to affect world price, as is 
more likely in the long run or when the u.s. is a major trader 
of sugar, then some positive elasticity is appropriate, and 
75 
the world sugar excess supply elasticity estimate of 2.37 from J 
Leu et. al. is used. 
Using the estimated OLS demand function (4.2), per capita 
sugar demand functions for 1971 and 1987 were found by 
including the appropriate values of the non-price variable, 
HFCS consumption, in the intercept: 
1971: 
1987: 
Q = 106.152 - 0.525 P(-1) 
Q = 63.464 - 0.525 P(-1) 
~
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
Multiplying by population and converting to metric tons give~ 
estimated total sugar demands: 
1971: 
1987: 
QT = 9995.897 - 49.437 P(-1) 
QT = 7015.348 - 58.034 P(-1) 
(5.3) 
( 5 . 4 ) 
The intercept shifted to the left by about 2.98 million metric 
tons between 1971 and 1987. If the 1971 equation is adjusted 
for 1987 population, it becomes: 
1987A: QT = 11734.105 - 58.034 P(-1) (5.5) 
This gives an estimated decrease of the intercept from 1971 to 
1987 of about 4.719 million metric tons. Equation (5.5.) can 
be used to estimate 1987 sugar demand, had no HFCS. 
--------------------·~-·--
substitution occurred. 
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The supply equation for 1987 calculated from Table 10 is: 
1987: Qs = 5238.+ 106.60 P(-1) ( 5. 6) 
where Qs is U.S. sugar production in th,ousand metric tons, 
refined basis, and P(-1} is as above. 
Empirical Measures of Welfare Impacts 
of Alternative U.S. Sugar 
Policies, 1987 
The Current Quota 
Table 11 gives estimates for the costs and benefits of 
the sugar quota in 1987. With a world excess supply 
elasticity of 2.37 and a premium of 5.35 cents, the quota 
caused losses to sugar users of $970 million, with HFCS 
substitution. This lo~s corresponds to area Paa'b'PT in 
Figure 12. Without HFCS substitution, the quota would have 
cost sugar users $1226 million, corresponding to area PoabPT 
in Figure 12. Substitution of HFCS for sugar between 1971 and 
1987 reduced the cost of the quota for sugar use~s by $256, 
corresponding to area a'ab' in Figure 12. 
With infinitely elastic world excess supply of sugar and 
a premium of 5.35 cents, the quota costs sugar users $1055 
million. Losses are larger than the $970 million with the 
positively sloped world excess supply, since the gap between 
u.s. targ~~ Erice and world price (PT-Po in Figure 12) is less 
- -- ,..___...... 
than the ~r~~~~ (PT-pq in Figure 12); with a horizontal 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 11 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SUGAR QUOTA PROGRAM, 1987 
Elasticity Sugar User Net Producer Net 
of Cost Social Gain Social 
World 
------------------
Gain Cost 
Excess HFCS Substitution From (with 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS HFCS 
Without With Substitution Substitution) 
------------------$million -------------------
2.37 1226 970 256 654 316 
infinite 1334 1055 278 710 345 
2.37 2522 1:.998 524 1318 679 
infinite 2680 2123 557 1397 726 
2.37 3892 3087 805 1991 1096 
infinite 4039 3204 835 2061 1143 
~L rc_,.,.,., ~ 
v "V ) 
...J 
...J 
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world price the two gaps are the same, as in Figure 13. 
In the case of world excess supply elasticity of 2.37 and 
a premium of 5.35 cents, producer gains due to the quota are 
$654 million. The loss to sugar buyers minus the gain to 
producers is net social cost, which is $316 million. With 
infinite world excess supply elasticity, net social cost would 
be $345 million. 
With a 16.05 cent premium and infinite world excess 
supply elasticity, the quota would cost sugar users $3204 
million, benefit producers $2061 million, and result in net 
social losses of $1143. The gain from HFCS in this case would 
be $835 million. 
Figure 19 reproduces sugar user losses and producer gains 
from Table 11 for the small country case. The gains to sugar 
producers are clearly smaller than the losses to sugar users. 
The cost of transferring benefits to sugar producers is 
demonstrated in Figure 20. With a 5.35 cent premium, it costs 
society $348 million to transfer $708 million to producers. 
Regardless of the premium, it costs society about half of the 
value of the gain to producers to effect the transfer with 
quotas. 
An Equivalent Tariff 
Gains and losses of a tariff equivalent to the current 
quota are shown in Table 12. The losses to sugar users and 
gains to sugar producers are the same as in Table 11. With a 
premium of 5.35 cents and the large country assumption, 
Elasticity 
of 
World 
Quota Excess 
Price Supply 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 2.37 
infinite 
10.70 2.37 
infinite 
16.05 2.37 
infinite 
TABLE 12 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EQUIVALENT TARIFF, 1987 
Sugar User Net Government Net 
Cost s octal Revenue Social 
------------------
Gain 
-----------------
Cost 
Substitution From Substitution (With 
------------------
HFCS Producer ----------------- HFCS 
Without With Substitution Gain Without With Substitution) 
-------------------------$million -------------------------------
1226 970 256 654 605 49 267~ 
1334 1055 278 710 605 49 296 t 
2522 1998 52-t 1318 1211 98 582 I 
2680 2123 557 1397 1211 98 628 I 
3892 3087 805 1991 1816 146 9so I 
4039 3204 835 2061 1816 146 996 '<' 
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government revenue from the tariff. is $49 millioJ! with HFCS 
substitution, corresponding to area lmb'd in Figure 12. 
Tariff revenue without substitution would have been $605 
million. There is no difference in tariff revenue between the 
large and small country cases, since revenue depends on the 
premium which, is the same in either case. 
If the premium were 16.05 cents, the government would 
collect $146 million from the tariff. The range of net social 
costs under a tariff is from $267 million to $996. 
Figure 21 compares the net social cost of the tariff and 
quota. Regardless of the premium, the quota is a more 
expensive policy to achieve the same transfer to producers. 
Deficiency Payment 
Table 13 shows the difference between a deficiency 
payment program and the current quota program. Under the 
-~~..,..,..--.......,...->i';'zy~~J>.'~~i!J>"""""'<~•r'"'~~''-·• .. P~~-~-,.._,......,..,.!1" .. ,.~4~'J;~'..1~,~--.,-,,,~.-N£'~"-~ 
small country assumption, with a 5.35 cent premium, sugar 
users would gain $1334 million, exactly equal to their losses 
under the quota or tariff. With world price constant the 
deficiency payment program would be equivalent to the free 
trade situation for sugar users. 
~ . . ... ,....l---.~~,-.. ,. ..... """'(""'""~---... ~--o.._·, ... ~
Under the large country assumption, consumers gain 
relative to a free trade situation, since world price falls 
below the free trade price and consumption rises above free 
trade quantity. The consumer gain over the free trade 
situation corresponds to area PdkaPo in Figure 12. With a 
5.35 cent premium the sugar user gain compared to the quota, 
(/) 
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Figure 21. Comparison of Net Social Losses from Quota 
and Equivalent Tariff, 1987 
Premium 
CD 
w 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 13 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DEFICIENCY PAYMENT PROGRAM 
COMPARED TO QUOTA, 1987 
Elasticity Sugar User Net 
of Gain Prod- Treasury Social 
World 
------------------
ucer Expend- Gain 
Excess Substitution Effect iture (With 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS 
Curve Without With Substitution) 
Gain in 
Sugar 
Exporter 
Earnings 
------------------$ million ---------------------------------
2.37 1294 1038 0 700 337 2032 
infinite 1334 1055 0 722 333 2016 
2.37 2622 2098 0 1413 685 1489 
infinite 2680 2123 0 1444 679 1464 
2.37 3986 3181 0 2138 1043 866 
infinite 4039 3204 0 2166 1038 841 
Q) 
.r:a. 
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$1038 million, exceeds the sugar user losses under the quota, 
$970 million, by $68 million. 
Sugar producers experience no difference between the 
quota and the deficiency payment program, except that some 
producer revenue now comes from the government. Treasury 
expenditures range from $700 million to $2166 million, 
compared to no Treasury expenditures under the quota. The net 
\ 
range from $337 
a deficiency payment progr~m over 
million to $1038 million. ~ a quota 
social gains of 
Comparison of Net Social Costs of Quota, 
Tariff and Deficiency Payment 
Table 14 presents a summary of the net social costs of 
the three programs. The deficiency payment program numbers 
are based on the assumption that, had the U.S. sugar price 
been at world price levels, no HFCS substitution would have 
occurred, since the world price level was below the estimated 
_______ ... ..-..... ~''""'"''-~""''""""',.,.,... .......... """""'-'·i<&>Y.c:'~-"·~ ....... ..,..._"""'""'_········t;j11'1:>---•lll""-"'W'S'1Kl~--~--. 
cost of production of HFCS. Table 14 shows that the quota and 
. ,....__.-----· 
tariff policies are far more expensive than the deficiency 
payment program. Negative numbers (net social gains) under 
the deficiency payment program show the theoretical 
possibility of a large country gaining from trade 
interference. 
Tables 13 and 15 show effects of alternative policies on 
the volume and value of trade. In Table 13, the last column 
shows the gains in exporter earnings from a deficiency payment 
program compared to the quota, and the range of estimates is 
TABLE 14 
NET SOCIAL COST COMPARISONS: QUOTA,TARIFF, 
DEFICIENCY PAYMENT, 1987 
Elasticity Quota or Tariff Price Premium 
of 
-----------------------------World 
Policy Excess 5.35 10.70 16.05 
Option Supply (cents per pound) 
------------
$million 
------------------
Current Quota 2.37 316 679 1096 
Policy infinite 345 726 1143 
Tariff 2.37 267 582 950 
infinite 296 628 996 
Deficiency 2.37 -21 -6 53 
Payment infinite 12 46 104 
86 
Volume 
Value 
TABLE 15 
U.S. SUGAR IMPORT VOLUME, VALUE AND QUOTA RENT 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS, 1987 
Elasticity of 
us World Excess 
Import Unit supply 
Quota 1000mt 2.37 
infinite 
Free Trade 1000mt 2.37 
infinite 
Quota $million 2.37 
infinite 
Free trade $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota rent $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota Price Premium 
------ cents/lb ---------
5.35 10.70 16.05 
413 413 413 
413 413 413 
5412 5705 6012 
5436 5740 6044 
219 219 219 
219 219 219 
2276 1751 1130 
2235 1683 1059 
49 98 146 
49 98 146 
CD 
....., 
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from $841 to $2032 million. In Table 15, the volume and value 
of u.s. sugar imports under the quota is compared to a free 
trade scenario. 
The quota necessary to achieve the target price of 22 
cents for raw sugar is 413 thousand metric ton~. Under free 
trade conditions the estimated imports of sugar would range 
from 5412 to 6044 thousand metric tons. The value of the 
/ 
quota imports evaluated at the target price is $~~~' 
compared to values of imports ranging from $1059 to $2276 
million under free trade. The value of the quota rent is 
shown to range from $49 to $146 million. Exporters who obtain 
quotas realize the U.S. price of 22 cents instead of the lower 
world price, as the U.S. does not auction its quotas. In the 
past, it is possible that quota holders gained sufficient 
benefits from the quota rent to offset the lower volume of 
trade which resulted from the higher U.S. price. This table 
~,_,..._,,__,,-.,,_'!!:IO:._....,...,,,_,,":)q"~\,>-. • .,_.,..,.,,- .. ~·:".~:,~·;'l)>'~'""':lt""'~~-l.or""''~~-t.),.,·,.~,.,¥·"~'li-·"'Y'"'' .... ;<.'•;o-,'.f"~:.t:o"-i:•.;:,$.•''~~-~~)',l.<..~ 
shows that this is not likely to be the case at present. The 
restrictions of sugar import volume necessary to achieve U.S. 
support price levels have reduced quota rents to a small 
fraction of the earnings which exporters would realize if 
there were no quotas. 
Forecast of Welfare Impacts 
for 1988 and 1989 
Validation of Eguations 
In this section the demand and supply equations will be 
used to forecast u.s. supply, demand and imports. The supply 
89 
equation and forecasts for 1988 and 1989 are shown in Table 
16~ and the demand equation and forecasts for 1988 and 1989, 
are shown in Table 17. An import equation was constructed by 
subtracting the supply from the demand equation~ and results 
are presented in Table 18. The numbers used for actual 
imports are derived by subtracting U.S. demand from U.S. 
production~ rather than using the figures for imports liste 
in the USDA Sugar and Sweetener Reports~ since the latter 
number includes some sugar destined for reexport. 
Validation statistics over the sample period~ 1971-87, 
are presented in Table 19. The root mean square simulation 
error of the demand equation is 200.211 thousand metric tons, 
where the mean value of demand over the sample. p_gr_Lod __ i!L 
--~· .. -·~ 
8462.047 thousand metric tons. The root mean square percent 
error is .025~ and Theil's inequality coefficient is .012. 
The forecast and actual demand are visually represented in 
Figure 22. 
The supply equation has a better fit than the demand 
equation over the sample period, which is a result of the 
Cooley-Prescott specification. The root mean square 
simulation error is 70.859 thousand metric tons~ where the 
mean of the supply variable is 5180.18 thousand metric tons. 
The root ~ean square percent error is .014~ and Theil's 
inequality coefficient is .007. 
The import equation has a less precise fit than the 
supply and demand equations. The root mean square simulation 
error is 207.88 thousand metric tons~ where the mean value of 
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TABLE 16 
SUGAR SUPPLY: ESTIMATED, ACTUAL AND FORECAST 
Year Intercept Slope Forecast Actual Error 
Supply Supply 
(1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
---thousand metric tons---
1971 4158 95.46 5118.99 5076.9 -42.10 
1972 4263 99.23 5275.81 5395.7 119.88 
1973 4022 92.24 4950.59 4874.3 -76.32 
1974 3768 91.95 4659.86 4602.1 -57.76 
1975 3758 95.88 5844.37 5895.1 50.70 
1976 3960 95.55 5591.14 5611.9 20.74 
1977 4016 93.41 4941.03 4910.7 -30.31 
1978 4149 93.41 4925.10 5003.1 78.03 
1979 3988 88.47 4841.13 4730.1 -111.00 
1980 4064 90.96 4887.31 4982.8 95.48 
1981 3945 88.21 5313.12 5274.4 -38.68 
1982 3974 88.20 4899.32 4917.5 18.18 
1983 3992 87.16 4848.57 4772.5 -76.05 
1984 4171 90.45 4998.67 5012.5 13.79 
1985 4382 93.03 5203.73 5115.0 -88.68 
1986 4864 100.38 5656.87 5678.0 21.15 
1987 5238 106.60 6098.68 6210.5 111.79 
(4) 1988 5447 110.20 6326.22 NA NA 
(4) 1989 5744 115.00 6649.60 NA NA 
Calculated from TVP supply equation. 
NA = Not Available 
( 1 ) Includes non-price term 
(2) Based on lagged price 
(3) Source: USDA Sugar and Sweeteners Reports 
(4) Forecast 
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TABLE 17 
SUGAR DEMAND: ESTIMATED, ACTUAL AND FORECAST 
Year Intercept Slope Estimated Actual Error 
Demand Demand 
(1) (2) (3) 
--thousand metric tons---
1971 9995.90 -49.44 9498.39 9614.3 -115.95 
1972 10071.60 -49.98 9561.65 9739.9 -178.25 
1973 10096.83 -50.46 9588.77 9688.5 -99.75 
1974 10111.79 -50.94 9617.95 9285.2 332.80 
1975 10030.79 -51.44 8911.37 8739.5 171.91 
1976 9923.53 -51.91 9037.12 9235.7 -198.58 
1977 9812.33 -52.44 9292.87 9408.8 -115.94 
1978 9677.75 -53.01 9237.22 9228.6 8.59 
1979 9519.19 -53.58 9002.26 9113.8 -111.56 
1980 9234.34 -54.22 8743.66 8634.5 109.19 
1981 8934.09 -54.77 8084.80 8283.5 -198.71 
1982 8684.14 -55.32 8103.89 7765.7 338.15 
1983 8374.95 -55.84 7825.88 7562.7 263.14 
1984 7910.39 -56.44 7393.90 7245.6 148.30 
1985 7118.37 -56.99 6615.26 6838.3 -223.06 
1986 7123.34 -57.51 6669.06 6594.5 74.59 
1987 7015.35 -58.03 6546.59 6875.6 -329.03 
(4)1988 6816.03 -58.59 6348.71 NA NA 
(4)1989 6700.87 -59.12 6235.34 NA NA 
calculated from demand equation 
NA = Not Available 
( 1) Includes non-price term 
(2) Based on lagged price 
( 3) Source: USDA Sugar and Sweeteners Reports 
(4) Forecast 
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TABLE 18 
SUGAR IMPORTS: ESTIMATED, ACTUAL 
AND FORECAST 
Year Demand Minus Er.ror 
Supply 
(Imports) 
-------------------
Projected Actual 
----Thousand metric tons---
1971 4379 4537 -158 
1972 4286 4344 -58 
1973 4638 4814 -176 
1974 4958 4683 275 
1975 3067 2844 223 
1976 3446 3624 -178 
1977 4352 4498 -146 
1978 4312 4226 87 
1979 4161 4384 -223 
1980 3856 3652 205 
1981 2772 3009 -237 
1982 3205 2848 356 
1983 2977 2790 187 
1984 2395 2233 162 
1985 1412 1723 -312 
1986 1012 916 96 
1987 448 665 -217 
(1)1988 22 NA NA 
(1)1989 -414 NA NA 
NA = Not Available 
(1) Forecast. Figures for 1987-89 are not exactly the 
same as in Tables 11-15 and 22-31 since these are 
based on actual price, and the other Tables are 
based on the target price 
TABLE 19 
VALIDATION MEASURES OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, IMPORT EQUATIONS 
Measure 
Root Mean Square Simulation Error 
(thousand metric tons) 
Root Mean Square Percent Error 
Mean Simulation Error 
Mean Percent Error 
Theil's Inequality Coefficient 
Mean of Variable 
--------Equation-----------
Supply Demand Import 
70.859 200.211 207.884 
0.014 0.025 0.110 
8.849 -7.304 -6.784 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.013 
0.007 0.012 0.030 
5180.183 8462.047 3281.863 
For formulas see Pindyck and Rubenfeld, Chapter 12 
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Figure 22. U.S. Sugar Demand, Predicted and Actual, 1971-89 
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~ 
imports is 3281.86. The root mean square percent error is 
.110, and Theil's inequality coefficient is .03. 
To create a U.S. demand equation for 1988 and 1989, a 
95 
forecast of per capita consumption of HFCS was used from Lin 
and Novick (1988). They forecast 1988 and 1989 levels of per 
____..,.-,~-·--·,__ __ _ 
capita HFCS consumption at 49.9 and 51.6 pounds per capita, 
' 
respectively. The Chicago-West price of sugar was forecast to 
be 24 cents (nominal) in 1987 and 1988, which is approximately 
the same as the 1987 price. The producer price index was 
assumed to rise at 3 percent annually and is used to arrive 
at a real price. Adjusted for the median projected U.S. 
population estimates for 1988 and 1989 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1988) the forecasted U.S. total sugar demand 
equations are: 
(1988a) 
(1988b) 
(1989a) 
(1989b) 
Q4 = 11847.257 - 58.593 P(-1) 
Q4 = 6838.373 - 58.593 P(-1) 
Q4 = 11953.186 - 59.117 P(-1) 
Q4 = 6724.618 - 59.117 P(-1) 
(5.7) 
( 5. 8) 
( 5 . 9 ) 
(5.10) 
where the "a" equations are the forecast equations, and the 
._ ....... '---·~-~--..., 
"b" equations will be used for estimates of the effect of HFCS 
substitution for sugar from 1971 to 1987. 
"----• ...__"-•..._~.,.,-~------~··-·•"'-•--•--"-••--·••~'"~'-•·•~•-•., '''-':"'''''' ',,,,,ff•-· • c•.,.;:;~ ..... ._..,.,,~.._..,,.._,_.....,. 
A forecast of the supply curve requires assumptions about 
how the time-varying parameters will vary in the future as 
well as a forecast of the exogenous variables. Whatever the 
source of parameter variation, it is hypothesized to continue 
with the same influence on the permanent trend in the 
parameters that they have exhibited since 1983. A linear 
extrapolation based on 1983-87 values was computed for each 
96 
supply parameter. The fertilizer price index was forecast to 
stay constant at ~-ll~--~9.Jt1 ... level _ !_()~ next two _y:ea!:s. Table 
16 shows the estimated values of the supply parameters for 
-·---~-----~-~~·•- _,._~., ,,., ••• ._,,_ ___ ,,,..,_._,,.,, ·- ·0''• ~"'·-~ ·-·<-- ' ''""'---N·-----~--··----·· "'"' ··------..~--• .. -.,.., ___ ,.~" ~-., •••~-··•---,_•,-•·~, ... ,.,.,.r _.., •· .,,. ___ ,~'"'-~..,.. 
1971-87 and projected supply for 1988-89, which is also shown 
in Figure 23. 
Forecast of Domestic Impacts 
The welfare results of the 1988 and 1989 forecasts from 
the model for the policy alternatives of a quota, tariff and 
deficiency payment are presented in Appendix Tables 22-31. A 
summary of the forecasted welfare effects of the quota and 
tariff for 1988 and 1989 is presented in Table 20. Using the 
excess supply assumption, producer gain is seen to increase 
., .... ' •. ······---~--- ___________ .,.,.._~---- .,..,,- -..-..J, ..-....... ,..,J<. ,_...... 
from $1397 million in 1987 to $1521 million in 1989. 
..,.---. - ~..... AI~--~11 
Sugar 
user losses are $2123 million in 1987, and decline to $2115 in 
1989. 
The forecast shows that producer gains increase by $124 
million from 1987 to 1989, and sugar user losses decrease by 
$8 million. Political pressure by producers to maintain 
current policy should remain high or perhaps even increase, 
even though the industry as a whole may shrink as a result of 
current policy. If sugar user incentives to eliminate the 
quotas are affected by their welfare losses, these results 
(/) 
c 
0 
1-
0 
·;:: 
+-' Q) 
~ 
"0 
c 
ct:l 
(/) 
:l 
0 
...c: 
1-
7000 
-a- Predicted 
-+- Actual, 
6000 
' 
5000 ~1-\, a ~ -~~ ~ 
40004-------------~----~----~------~-----.------~----~ 
70 75 80 85 90 
Figure 23. U.S. Sugar Supply, Predicted and Actual, 1971-89 
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TABLE 20 
COMPARISON OF QUOTA AND TARIFF, 1987-89 
------------Year-------------
Category 1987 1988 1989 
---------$million------------
QUOTA 
Net Social Cost 726 665 594 
Producer Gain 1397 1449 1521 
Sugar User Loss 2123 2114 2115 
'l'ARIFF 
Net Social Cost 628 665 692 
Government Revenue 98 0 -98 
All calculations based on assumption of infinite world excess 
supply elasticity, premium of 10.70, and with HFCS 
substitution 
99 
indicate such incentives should decrease over the next two 
years. 
Forecast of Trade Imoacts 
Table 21 shows that imports decline from 413 thousand 
metric tons in 1987 to zero in 1988, and then. become negative, 
i.e. exports of 414 thousand metric~ns in 1989. Figure 24 
.~---""····--"'"'-'"--····~-0~.........- ---·~"'-·~ 
shows predicted and forecast imports for 1971-89. While it 
seems unlikely that the U.S. would ever become a net sugar 
exporter, it is .~e.rJ,n_g to realize 'that the European 
Community was until the mid-1970s one of the world's largest 
sugar importers and now exports about 6 million tons per year, 
second only to Cuba. 
The value of the quota rent to exporters is lost as U.S . 
...... ,...., .. ~~--............... , ............. .......--- Ill'- .. .,-
imports end, and under the 1989 projection the U.S. would be 
competing for export markets. Under an alternative free trade 
policy, Table 20 shows u.s. sugar imports would be 5642 and 
5449 thousand metric tons in 1988 and 1989, respectively. 
The reduction of sugar imports has had a large impact on 
some countries. For the Do~!IJlg.an_ .. Ke..p.u.b_l.lc, for example, the 
--·-·------
reduction in the value of their annual U.S. quota from 1982/83 
to 1987 was $126.4 million, while u.s. foreign aid to the 
and Hurley p. 75). Thirteen Caribbean countries have faced 
reduced sugar earnings fr_QIYLd.e.cJJning U.S. quotas in recent 
,._,.......,-...._,..,.,.,,.-·=-' "''""-''"~'-··•·· -">'•"-"•>">--'>•-'''~'' __ .. ,._.,_<o.•.-f~· .. ,.-.. ,.~,.,.n,...,..._, __ _.._, _ 
years, eleven of them countries to which the u.s. gives 
substantial foreign aid. The reduction of sugar export 
TABLE 21 
US IMPORT VOLUME, VALUE AND QUOTA RENT, 1987-89 
Quota Volume 
Quota Value 
Quota rent (2) 
Free Trade Volume (2) 
Free Trade Value 
Unit 
1000mt 
$million 
$million 
1000mt 
$million 
--------- Year----------
1987 
413 
219 
98 
5740 
1683 
1988 1989 
0(1) -414· 
0 -219 
0 -98 
5642 5449 
1654 1598 
(1) Actual value from model was 0.02 thousand metric tons, 
which rounds to zero 
(2) All calculations made under assumption of infinite world 
excess supply elasticity and 10.70 cent premium. 
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earnings is not directly comparable to foreign aid dolla~s, 
--------+ 
since the earnings are not all profit. 
The U.S. might want to maintain, for political reasons, a 
certain level of imports over the next few years. Suppose it 
-~---- .----~~-~--~-- ··~·- -~--- -.. ---..-~-.... ·---·~---- .,.,_ -·· -----~~·~-..\ 
was decided that a level of 500 thousand metric tons (refined 
basis) of sugar would be imported. The model shows that in 
order to attain this level of imports, the Chicago-West sugar 
price would need to b~ 15.23 cents iJl_"_J._~Jl8, and 8.0 cents in 
''··-- ~·-~ ... --.....~----~ -----------~----......_, 
1989. Currently, the MSP for raw sugar .. t§ __ ~'t---~·-cent_g;_~_below 
·- ...... -----· --~ . ' -~-- . . -· --
the Chicago-West price, so approximate levels of the MSP 
-~.... ...._ .. _.....,... 
needed to maintain the import target of 500 thousand metric 
tons would be 13.23 cents in 1988 and 6 cents in 1989. It .,.....,.. ____ .. __ _ 
must be kept in mind that these forecasts are only indicative, 
and based on the many assumptions used to create the ~\-
forecasts. Many possible events, such as a world sugar price 
·--~ ..... ,,. ............... "-
spike or a major drought, could cause the forec~J?.!.s to be off. 
"'"·"""-~.,.,.,,,,_...!>'""' •' ·- .v•·••-·'""'"_ . ._._,~ .. ~-
The U.S. has proposed at the negotiations currently 
occurring under the Uruguay round of the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that all agricultural subsidies and 
trade-interfering policies be eliminated over the next ten 
years. Current sugar policy is clearly inconsistent with the 
U.S. position at the GATT, and could jeopardize the progress 
of the talks if it contributes to a sense among other 
countries that the U.S. is hypocritical about its free trade 
position. If the above short-run forecasts of sugar imports 
are even of the correct sign, the u.s. "free trade" bargaining 
•·--~-··---·-·-_,.._-~,-., •. ~.-->-< ~ """'".,.....,,. .. ,,. ... u•.:-i"""'' ; . ..._ _ v>''..,...,_...,..,~-
position at the GATT will be weakened. It would be difficult 
103 
to argue that Japan, for example, should open up their rice, 
beef, and other agricultural markets to U.S. exports when we 
are protecting sugar in much the same way that Japan is 
protecting its domestic ~g:r;J~ulture. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
U.S. sugar policy has successfully protected u.s. sugar 
producers, but has triggered trends in sugar supply and demand 
and related markets which may force a reevaluation of the 
policy in the near future. The declining imports of sugar due 
to lower quotas has harmed many politically fri_en<ily less 
developed countries. The HFCS industry, which now uses about 
six percent of the U.S. corn crop, is a major unintended 
~" ~ ""'----~ -- ~-~--- ~··-····w·-"-······-··~·-"-"~'".....,..""'''>•'~'-"""~ 
beneficiary of the policy. u.s. corn farmers are also 
. ···'" ·-~- '·"'''' '""'""<ri 
unintended beneficiaries to the extent that HFCS provides an 
additional demand for about 500 million bushels of corn. 
The procedures used in this study were as follows. u.s. 
supply and demand for sugar were estimated with annual data 
from 1971-87 using both Ordinary Least Squares and the Cooley-
Prescott random coe!f.i~.~nts model. An equilibrium demand 
,.-...-··- "·'--.. ,..__ _ ...-. 
substitution of HFCS for su9~~· A classical welfare analysis, 
-~--······----~'""~'-......... ~ ...... ,,_,_ --~· . .------ , .. 
using the concepts of consumer and producer surplus, was used 
to estimate the welfare losses to the U.S. of current sugar 
policy under various assumptions about the world price and 
excess supply elasticity facing the U.S •• Forecasts of u.s. 
sugar demand, supply and imports were made. 
104 
105 
The specific objectives of this study were to: 
1) measure the effects of U.S. sugar quotas on 
·--~,.,, .. ,,. . ..., ..... -•-''"/,-. ..._,. ...... ,.,~ 
P;E.ducers, consumers, taxpayers, and foreign suppliers 
__ .... --~ .............. ~ .... ~ ---"-· ~·· ,_._,.,_.....,--....- _,.. .. .,..., ...... ,.,~--~~ ·--- .... _______ _ 
2) measure the welfare effects of the recent trend 
of substitution of HFCS for sugar 
3) evaluate the welfare effects of the alternative 
policies of an equivalent tariff and a deficiency payment 
program 
4) forecast the welfare effects of continuation of 
the current quota policy for the next two years. 
In the light of these objective, the principle 
conclusions are: 
1) The u.s. quota policy imposes significant costs on 
the u.s. economy, ranging from $654 to $2061 million in 
..&"'"'-"-"""~,-....... ,..._....,. ''"''"'•···,,-,""'·..-.>!!'.-----.,.,.._ __ ,___ _ 
1987, depending on assumptions about the world price of 
~ .. ._ ----------~·~«-~~" ..... '"'".,..,·-"""""~.........--k-.... ~"'-"·"~"""-""""""' ,,..,..,.ot·~·,.. .... ,... ...... <l< __ , __ "" ... ,....,.....,. .... ,., ...... ...., 
sugar and the elasticity of world excess sugar supply 
facing the U.S. Producers gain from $256 to $835 
million, and sugar users suffer losses of $970 to $3204. 
The quota was shown to cost about 50 cents for each I dollar transferred to producers. The welfare measures " ···-~··--"--~-----............---....,----
are conservative in the sense that they do not capture 
effects on the final consumer, which if included would 
----------
result in larger estimates of all net social losses. 
-"···" ..... --~·---------------
u.s. sugar quota imports are below projected free 
trade import levels by almost 5 million metric tons, 
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which translates into_large revenue losses for sugar 
exporters. The gains to exporters from the quota rent 
are from $49 to $146 million in 1987, far below 
'~-.... _...-........... -v-·-·•''"'"' _ ..-~-,·-~···'"''#""''·"-"""·- ..... '--""~,~....,..,.,-
projected revenue under free trade of from $1059 to 
-----........~.--·---------·---·---
$2276 million. For the U.S. to decide to maintain sugar 
imports of 500 thousand metric t..on.§ in._1.9...89 in order to 
'1"'.-----~----..-...--- ...... - ... -· .... -----,..._ - . --"'"-'"'~-""·-··'"·"'<"-"""'"''''''~-'"-""'..,.,_ 
assist low inco~gar ~-:l!.P2!:~i..ll.Q .. ~-c.ou.!!p_~~es, the model 
predicts that the domest"ic price would have to be 
lowered to about 6 cents (raw sugar) . 
•. ·--~'"'"''"'"''-'lf.O"~fr"'·><oli.~-
2) The substitution of HFCS for sugar, which was 
induced largely due to the fact that the U.S. sugar 
price was far above the world price, has significantly 
reduced the net social cost of U.S. sugar policy. For 
1987 the net social gain due the HFCS substitution is 
estimated to range from $256 to $835 million. This is a 
large gain, and is a ~ gain, over and above the 
benefits to the corn sweetener industry. Such 
substitutions, made by cost-minimizing agents, serve not 
only to benefit the agents and frustrate the policy 
which causes them to arise, but also benefit society, a 
point made by Adam Smith in 1776 in The Wealth of 
Nations. 
3) The quota is found to be a less efficient policy 
than the alternatives of an equivalent tariff or a 
deficiency payment program. For 1987 an equivalent 
107 
tariff would have reduced the net social loss of sugar 
policy by $49 to $146 million, compared to the quota. A 
deficiency payment program would have saved the U.S. 
$333 to $1038 million compared to the quota. The 
conclusion that a quota is less efficient than a tariff 
or deficiency payment program is generally supported by 
economic theory. 
4) If current policy and trends continues, the u.s. 
sugar deficit is forecast to become a surplus in two 
years. This would harm other sugar exporting countries. 
Domestic welfare effects would depend heavily upon how 
the U.S. responded to its new surplus sugar position. 
Export subsidies or Commodity Credit Corporation 
purchases would require Federal expenditures, which 
current legislation prohibits. The evidence in this 
study supports a conclusion that a welfare transfer from 
sugar exporting countries to U.S. sugar producers, HFCS 
pro~ucers and corn growers has occurred. This transfer, 
which harms the relatively poorer sugar exporters, may 
not be acceptable in the light of U.S. foreign policy, 
especially the Caribbean Basin Initiative which seeks to 
strengthen the private sectors and economic performance 
of Caribbean countries. 
It should be noted that as in almost all cases, the 
welfare transfers found in this study may be uneven; for 
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example, raw sugar refiners have traditionally depended 
heavily upon raw sugar imports, and they have suffered under 
the quota policy even though they would be classified in the 
sugar producing industry. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
This study has suggested that U.S. HFCS producers and 
corn growers have benefitted from sugar policy. Further 
research could be done to quantify that transfer, as well as 
the transfer from foreign producers to u.s. sweetener 
producers. This study has focused on the im 
p~ad-.Q!l..,J:,!!~.,,.~!,2,£~!!,~~---~!-~~-~:~~~es, but research 
on the distributional effects of suga!,_RElicx; would be 
--------- ... -·--~~q..... ¢ $ •• ,...,......~--- --........... ~ • ~·~ 
necessary before any comprehensive evaluation of sugar policy 
could be attempted. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE COOLEY-PRESCOTT MODEL 
The following is a brief description of the Cooley-
Prescott model. The derivations are from Cooley and Prescott 
(1976) and Judge et. al. (1985), where more detail is given. 
The process to be modelled is: 
(A.l) 
where Yt is the tth observation of the dependent variable, Xt 
is the observation vector on k explanatory variables and 13t 
is the parameter vector, which is stochastic. There are 
considered to be two types- of variation possible in the 
parameter vector, permanent and transient. The parameter 
vector is modeled as: 
(A. 2) 
(A. 3) 
where a~ is the permanent component of the parameter vector. 
The Ut and Vt are identically and independently distributed 
normal variates with mean vectors zero and covariance 
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structures known up to scale factors. They can be 
parameterized as follows: 
(A. 4) 
COV(Vt:) = Yf12Ev (A. 5) 
where again, E~ and Ev are known up to scale factors. The 
transitory change in the intercept will correspond to the 
additive disturbance term in a conventional regression model, 
when an intercept is present and a normalization setting a~11 
and av11 equal to one. The unknowns are the Pt:, 
unchanging aa and Y which specify the covariance 
and the \ 
structure. 
The objective is to estimate these unknowns. 
The process generating the parameters is non-stationary 
and it is thus impossible to specify the likelihood function. 
However, the likelihood function conditional on the value of 
the parameter process at a particular point in time is 
defined, and specific realizations of the parameter process 
can be treated as random parameters to be estimated. 
Choosing period T+1, one period past the sample, 
T+l 
a¥~1 = a~ + vT~1 = B@ + E v. (A. 6) 
s=t+1 
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T+1 
a~ = a¥~1 E v. ·+ u~ (A. 7) 
s=t+1 
Now we can rewrite equation (A.l): 
Y~ = x•~a + J..t~ (A. 8) 
where 
a = a¥~1 (A. 9) 
and 
T+l 
).l = x'~u~ - x'~ r: v. ( A.10) 
s=t+l 
The error term of equation (A.8), J.,t, is distributed normally 
with mean zero and covariance matrix: 
cov(Jl) = ua((1-Y)R + YQ] = u2~(Y) (A.ll) 
where R is a diagonal matrix with 
ru. = (x' ii:uxi) (A.12) 
and 0 is a matrix such that 
q~~ = min(T-i+l, T-j+1)x'~r:vx~ (A.13) 
To estimate the permanent component of the parameter vector 
in some period t, B~, the appropriate formulae for the QL~ 
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are: 
(A.14) 
if both i and j exceed or are less than t. Otherwise, q~~ = 
0. Compiling the equations, a full model can be written 
Y = XB + )l (A.15) 
where f3 is the k-component vector for period T+l, Y is the T 
component vector of the y~, and X is the Txk matrix of 
observations on the independent variables. Y is distributed 
as: 
Y ~ N[ Xf3, az~(Y)J (A.16) 
The unknown parameter Y indicates how the B's are 
adapting to structural change; if Y is large (close to one) 
then permanent changes are large relative to transitory 
changes; is Y is close to zero, then permanent changes are 
small relative to transitory changes. 
The log likelihood function of the observations is the 
multivariate normal form: 
T T 1 
L(Y;a,aa:,Y,X) = ln 2Tt - lnaz - ln I~ ( Y > I 
2 2 2 
1 -1 
(y-Xf3)'~(Y) (y-Xf3) (A.17) 
2az 
The above likelihood function can be maximized partially with 
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respect to P and uz to obtain estimators conditional on Y; 
-1 
B(Y) = [X'~(Y) X] 
-1 
X'~(Y) Y ( A.18) 
1 -1 
[(Y-X8(Y))'a(Y) (Y-X8(Y))] (A.19) 
T 
These two equations are substituted into (A.17) to determine 
a concentrated log likelihood function: 
T T 1 T 
Lc(Y;Y) = ln2n- ln s 1 (Y) - lnla(Y)I -
2 2 2 2 
T T 1 
= (ln2n+1) - ln st(Y) - lni~(Y) I (A.20) 
2 2 2 
Estimation proceeds by maximizing (A.20) with respect to Y. 
Since Y is restricted to the range 0 ~ Y ~ 1, this can be 
done iteratively with small computational cost. Once an 
estimate of Y, say g, is obtained, B(g) and sz(g) can be 
obtained. 
Cooley and Prescott show that g is consistent for Y and 
that B(Y) is asymptotically efficient and asymptotically 
yields optimal predictions. Due to the non-stationarity, 
however, there is no consistent estimator for p,+1• 
The relative variability of the parameters is not often 
known empirically, requiring an estimate of the matrices Eu 
and Ev. In the absence of other information, the covariance 
matrix of the coefficient vector from ordinary least squares 
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is used as an estimator for both Eu and Ev. If there is no 
covariance between elements of the a vector, then Eu and Ev 
will be diagonal matrices, and in this paper it is assumed 
that the matrices are diagonal. 
Cooley and Prescott found the model to be robust with 
respect to variation in Eu and Ev. 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES OF FORECASTED WELFARE MEASURES 
OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. SUGAR POLICIES 
FOR 1988 AND 1989 
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Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 22 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SUGAR QUOTA, 1988 
Elaaticity Sugar User Net Producer Net 
of Cost Social Gain social 
World 
------------------
Gain Cost 
Excess HFCS Substitution From (with 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS HFCS 
Without With Substitution Substitution) 
------------------$million -------------------
2.37 1237 964 272 677 288 
infinite 1348 1051 297 736 315 
2.37 2544 1986 558 1365 622 
infinite 2708 2114 593 1449 665 
2.37 3929 3071 858 2063 1008 
infinite 4080 3190 890 2138 1052 
... 
... 
1..0 
Elasticity 
of 
World 
Quota Excess 
Price Supply 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 2.37 
infinite 
10.70 2.37 
infinite 
16.05 2.37 
infinite 
TABLE 23 
COSTS AND BENEFITSOF AN EQUIVALENT TARIFF, 1988 
Sugar User Net Government Net 
Cost Social Revenue Social 
------------------
Gain 
-----------------
Cost 
Substitution From Substitution (With 
------------------
HFCS Producer ----------------- HFCS 
Without With Substitution Gain Without With Substitution) 
--------------- ----------$million -------------------------------
1237 964 272 677 593 0 288 
1348 1051 297 736 593 0 315 
2544 1986 558 1365 1187 0 622 
2708 2114 593 1449 1187 0 665 
3929 3071 858 2063 1780 0 1008 
4080 3190 890 2138 1780 0 1052 
t-' 
N 
C) 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 24 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DEFICIENCY PAYMENT PROGRAM 
COMPARED TO QUOTA, 1988 
Elasticity Sugar User Net 
of Gain Prod- Treasury Social 
World 
------------------
ucer Expend- Gain 
Excess Substitution Effect iture (With 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS 
Curve Without With Substitution) 
Gain in 
Sugar 
Exporter 
Earnings 
------------------$million ---------------------------------
2.37 1307 1034 0 725 309 2209 
infinite 1348 1051 0 748 303 2194 
2.37 2649 2091 0 1463 627 1679 
infinite 2708 2114 0 1496 618 1654 
2.37 4026 3169 0 2214 954 1068 
infinite 4080 3190 0 2244 946 1042 
.... 
N 
.... 
TABLE 25 
NET SOCIAL COST COMPARISONS: QUOTA,TARIFF, 
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS, 1988 
Elasticity Quota or Tariff Price Premium 
of 
-----------------------------
World 
Policy Excess 5.35 10.70 16.05 
Option Supply (cents per pound) 
------------ $million ------------------
Current Quota Policy 2.37 288 622 1008 
infinite 315 665 1052 
Tariff 2.37 288 622 1008 
infinite 315 665 1052 
Deficiency Payment 2.37 -21 -6 54 
infinite 12 47 106 
~ 
N 
N 
Volume 
Value 
TABLE 26 
U.S. SUGAR IMPORT VOLUME, VALUE AND QUOTA RENT 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAHS 1 1988 
Elasticity of 
us World Excess 
Import Unit Supply 
Quota 1000mt 2.37 
infinite 
Free Trade lOOOmt 2.37 
infinite 
Quota $million 2.37 
infinite 
Free trade $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota rent $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota Price Premium 
------ cents/lb ---------
5.35 10.70 16.05 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
5311 5605 5913 
5336 5642 5947 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2235 1723 1113 
2194 1654 1042 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1-' 
1\.) 
w 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 27 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SUGAR QUOTA PROGRAM, 1989 
Elasticity Sugar User Net Producer Net 
of Cost Social Gain Social 
World 
------------------
Gain Cost 
Excess HFCS Substitution From (with 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS HFCS 
Without With Substitution Substitution) 
-~----------------$million -------------------
2.37 1245 961 283 708 254 
infinite 1361 1051 310 772 279 
2.37 2563. 1982 581 1429 553 
infinite 2134 2115 619 1521 594 
2.31 3961 3067 894 2164 903 
infinite 4120 3191 929 2246 945 
... 
N 
• 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
. 10. 70 
16.05 
TABLE 28 
COSTS AND BENEFITSOF AN EQUIVALENT TARIFF, 1989 
Elasticity Sugar User Net Government Net 
of Cost Social Revenue Social 
World 
------------------
Gain 
-----------------
Cost 
Excess Substitution From substitution (With 
Supply 
------------------
HFCS Producer ----------------- HFCS 
Without With Substitution Gain Without With substitution 
-------------------------$million------------------------------
2.37 1245 961 283 708 571 -49 303 
infinite 1361 1051 310 772 571 -49 328 
2.37 2563 1982 581 1429 1141 -98 650 
infinite 2734 2115 619 1521 1141 -98 692 
2.37 3961 3067 89-t 2164 1712 -147 1050 
infinite 4120 3191 929 2246 1712 -147 1091 
... 
N 
Ul 
Quota 
Price 
Premium 
c/lb 
5.35 
10.70 
16.05 
TABLE 29 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OFDEFICIENCY PAYMENT PROGRAM 
COMPARED TOQUOTA, 1989 
Elasticity Sugar User Net 
of Gain Prod- Treasury Social 
World 
------------------
ucer Expend- Gain 
Excess Substitution E £feet lture· (With 
supply ------------------ HFCS 
Curve Without With Substitution) 
Gain in 
Sugar 
Exporter 
Earnings 
------------------$million---------------------------------
2.37 1319 1036 0 760 276 2349 
infinite 1361 1051 0 784 267 2334 
2.37 2674 2093 0 1534 559 1841 
infinite 2734 2115 0 1569 546 1817 
2.37 4065 3171 0 2322 849 1253 
infinite 4120 3191 0 2353 838 1228 
.... 
N 
en 
TABLE 30 
NET SOCIAL COST COMPARISONS: OUOTA,TARIFF, 
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS, 1989 
Elasticity Quota or Tariff Price Premium 
of 
-----------------------------
World 
Policy Excess 5.35 10.70 16.05 
Option Supply (cents per pound) 
------------ $million ------------------
Current Quota Policy 2.37 254 553 903 
infinite 279 594 945 
Tariff 2.37 303 650 1050 
infinite 328 692 1091 
Deficiency Payment 2.37 -22 -6 54 
infinite 12 48 107 
..... 
N 
......, 
Volume 
Value 
TABLE 31 
U.S. SUGAR IMPORT VOLUME, VALUE AND QUOTA RENT 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS, 1989 
Elasticity of 
us World Excess 
Import Unit Supply 
Quota 1000mt 2.37 
infinite 
Free Trade 1000mt 2.37 
infinite 
Quota $million 2.37 
infinite 
Free trade $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota rent $million 2.37 
infinite 
Quota Price Premium 
------ cents/lb ---------
5.35 10.70 16.05 
I 
-414 -414 -414 
-414 -414 -414 
5118 5411 5720 
5144 5449 5755 
-219 -219 -219 
-219 -219 -219 
2156 1666 1080 
2115 1598 1009 
-49 -98 -147 
-49 -98 -147 
.... 
N 
CD 
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